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ABSTRACT
In the early morning hours of May 16th, 1846 Parliament gathered for the final reading to
repeal the Corn Laws. While the Corn Laws had been a highly contested topic within Britain for
over two decades, it was at this juncture that the Conservative party of Sir Robert Peel fractured.
As this study shall demonstrate, the Corn Law crisis of 1846 did not destroy Peel’s version of
Conservativism as has often been argued, but rather put it into a state of suspended animation.
The division of the party only twelve years after its formation has long been a topic of interest to
historians. As previous histories have suggested, Peel had attempted to revive the old idea of
Toryism but also to transform it into his new Conservative idea. This thesis goes beyond this to
suggest that Peel’s own unique form of Conservatism not only shaped the party in 1834 but also
helped it to recover after the split of 1846. As the blueprint for Conservative political discourse,
the ideas set forth in Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto (1834) outlined the fundamental structures and
tenets for a national Conservative party. His central argument was that Conservatives should
work to actively reform state institutions as a way of preserving them. This was a revolutionary
idea and the central pillar of Tamworth Conservatism. Illustrating his own form of
Conservativism the manifesto identified what this new political ideology was to entail for his
first ministry (1835) and beyond. Peel’s visions for the party after 1835 started a new type of
political discourse in British politics. This new discourse was centered on the ideals of
preservation of state institutions via careful reforms. To establish a new political organization his
Tamworth Conservativism had to become the party’s standard. Peel’s Manifesto, guided the
growth and formation of a party ideology from 1834 to 1846. Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn
ix

Laws in 1846 was met with fierce Conservative opposition, leading to an internal party rebellion.
Conservative division in 1846 was fueled by discontent with Conservative leadership and the
perceived opaqueness of Peel’s Conservative principles. However, the Conservative split of 1846
did not result in the abandonment of Conservatism but a period of Conservative dormancy. The
Conservative party, unlike Peel’s political career, survived and was rebuilt to become a serious
contender in British politics. More than a bit ironically, the restoration of Conservativism in 1852
was based upon a return to its origins in Peel’s manifesto; a Conservativism that was built upon
the ideas of careful, active, and thought-out reforms designed to preserve and protect state
institutions. This suggests that the legacy of Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism and the Corn Laws
crisis of 1846 were more intertwined with each other than previously recognized in the
historiography.

x

CHAPTER I
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN THE HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
In the early morning hours of May 16th 1846 Parliament gathered for the final reading of
the Act that would repeal the Corn Laws and in so doing would bring the demise of Peel’s
ministry and fracture the party he had created. However, as this thesis shall demonstrate, the
Conservative split of 1846 did not result in the collapse of Conservative party but rather a period
of Conservative dormancy. True, the fight to repeal the Corn Laws destroyed Peel’s political
career and nearly destroyed his Conservativism, but the crisis of 1846 did not damage Peel’s
Conservative party beyond repair. After a long season of dormancy Peel’s Conservativism
reemerged with a seemingly new direction but with a familiar strategy. This thesis shall argue
that the formation of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism, as the foundational ideology for the
Conservative party, and the Conservative split over the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 remain
more closely intertwined than previously stated in the historiography. This connection between
the formation of Peel’s Conservativism and the party schism caused by the Corn Laws suggests
that Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism did not end when Peel stepped down in 1846.
The Corn Laws were part of a long tradition of government regulations over imports and
exports of grains that predated the nineteenth century. The Importation Acts of 1815 (Geo. 3
c.26), most infamously known as the Corn Laws, were a set of tariff laws that dated back to the
seventeenth century.1 The 1815 modification had created a paradigm shift in the tariff by
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establishing a total exclusion of Corn until the domestic price of Corn reached 80 Shillings per
quarter (480lbs).2 These laws, even in their own time, were largely unpopular in a country that
was already moving towards a system of free trade. The Corn Laws’ design was to protect
British grain from being undercut by cheaper foreign alternatives. At base, the Corn Laws
suffered the flaw of being too rigid of a system that generated little to no revenue for the state
while pushing up the price of flour and bread for consumers. Demands to change the Corn Laws
arose in the late 1820s and resulted in the adoption of a new sliding scale that was designed to
lower the import duty on foreign grain as the price of domestic grain rose. The problem of the
Corn Laws was their indisputable linkage to the interests of the landed aristocracy. The tie
between economic protectionism and the aristocracy became more overt as time progressed.
Aristocratic members of Parliament were well aware of the shrinking of their own power,
particularly after the passage of the Reform Bill in 1832 which had removed their monopoly over
the electorate. Maintenance of the Corn Laws came to be seen as the landed interests’ last great
attempt to retain control over the economy for their own benefit. Thus, popular disgust with the
Corn Laws also became disgust with the economic and political position of the aristocracy.
The growing discontent with the aristocracy’s maintenance of the Corn Laws created one
of the most powerful political interest groups to emerge in Britain. The formation of the AntiCorn Law League (ACLL) created a public movement against the Corn Laws and the aristocratic
landlords that supported them.3 The League’s purpose was to pressure the government to repeal
the Corn Laws in their entirety. The propaganda from the League created an atmosphere of
national political unrest that was increased by the humanitarian crisis associated with the potato
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famine in Ireland. Historians have recognized the connection between the famine and the repeal
of the Corn Laws as significant, noting that while the ACLL pressured the government to repeal
the Laws for many years it was the crisis in Ireland which finally forced the change. Peel’s
decision in late autumn of 1845 to repeal the Corn Laws was because of growing food shortages
in Ireland, and growing political unrest in England. The Corn Law crisis split the Conservative
party over the continuation of the Corn Laws and the doctrine of protectionism. The division of
the Conservative party in 1846 typically appears to be a division between traditionalists and
reformers. However, this division, when investigated closely, appears to be a division over
Conservativism itself, more specifically the Conservativism of the party’s founder Sir Robert
Peel.
The Conservative party prior to the Corn Law crisis had struggled with the ideas of
reform and how to maintain institutions of the state (the church, the aristocracy, the economy,
and the Monarchy) in this new industrial age. The Conservatives and, to a greater extent, the
Tories,4 were often criticized for their support of an unpopular series of laws. The histories of
both the ACLL and the repeal of the Corn Laws have shown little sympathy to the Protectionist
Conservatives who dominated the party after repeal. Portrayed often as economic dunces and
aloof landed aristocrats, the Protectionists have been cast aside as the losers in a battle for
Britain’s economic future. However, they would play an important role in salvaging the
Conservative party of Robert Peel and transforming it into a powerful political force in British
politics. Ironically, their revival of the Conservative party would require a return to the message
that Peel had used to reorganize the Tories into the Conservative party in the first place.
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Peel, Conservativism, and the Corn Laws A Historiographical Study
The split in Peel’s Conservative party during the Corn Law crisis has created a problem
for historians analyzing Peel’s own Conservativism. The division of the Conservative party only
twelve years after its formation is a major point of interest. Why had Peel’s seemingly pragmatic
and necessary actions in 1846 so bitterly divided the party and why had that division become so
heated? This question has been the subject of numerous works analyzing the Conservative party
and the Conservative political and economic discourses between 1830 and 1852. Of particular
interest to historians have been the politics of Sir Robert Peel. Those who have investigated this
puzzle have searched for an explanation as to why Peel decided to repeal the Corn Laws and why
his party became so bitterly divided that it prevented the Conservative party from holding a
majority government for a generation. Previous historical studies have investigated this problem
and have focused upon the politics of Sir Robert Peel. These works argue that the making of
Peel’s Conservative party and the Corn Law crisis of 1846 were the dual climax points of his
political career. As these historians have suggested, the politics of Peel and his Conservative
party were dramatically altered in the wake of the fundamental reshaping of the British political
system occasioned by the passage of the Great Reform Bill of 1832. Politicians had to create a
wholly new approach towards the electorate.
Philip Salmon’s work Electoral Reform at Work: Local Politics and National Parties
1832-1841 suggested that the period before the second Peel Ministry (1841) saw the emergence
of a new type of party politics. Salmon argued that Peel’s revival of the Tory party, through his
Tamworth Manifesto, rallied the party to reorganize itself into a new type of political

4

organization designed to work in the post-Reform Bill era.5 Peel’s Manifesto set a foundation for
a new form of partisan politics and helped to create more rigid political parties built around
clearly delineated ideological frameworks. The most crucial part of Salmon’s thesis was that this
system of new political parties and the systems in which they operated were part of an ongoing
and active process. Peel’s Conservative party in this early period (1834-5) was undergoing a
continuous process of adaptations and modifications to the new political environment. While
Peel had successfully imagined a new political party for the post-Reform Bill era, he had to
actively work to mold the old Tories into new Conservatives. Salmon argues that when Peel
accepted the changes of 1832 he initiated a new age of British politics. Peel’s new political
organization illustrated that the new type of politics being developed was largely influenced by
the changes initiated by the Reform Bill.
Norman Gash, the foremost biographer of Sir Robert Peel, has analyzed the life and
legacy of both Peel and his administrations. His most notable works were his two-volume
biography of Robert Peel, respectively titled Mr. Secretary Peel (1961), and Sir Robert Peel
(1972) and his successful political study Politics in the Age of Peel (1953). Although his
interpretations of Peel’s politics have been challenged in recent analyses’, his biographies remain
the most definitive and complete historical works in the field. In each of these
works, Gash investigated the reshaping of parliamentary politics in what he terms the ‘Age of
Peel’.
In Politics in the Age of Peel Gash argued that after the passage of the Great Reform Bill
(1832) both the Whigs and the Tories had to redesign themselves to fit into a new system
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of electoral politics.6 Leading this new age of political change was Robert Peel. Gash claimed
that Peel’s political views were pragmatic and took a centrist approach to reform Toryism in the
post-Reform Bill era. Gash’s detailed analysis of electoral workings post-1832 suggests that the
Reform Bill initiated some political changes but did not constitute an extreme change, and can be
best explained by understanding those who drafted it. The men that drafted the Reform Bill were
not, as Gash argued, battling over abstract principles, but rather working to prevent a disaster.
Gash stated that, “Both parties believed in property not numbers: both were anxious to avert
bloodshed and disorder.”7He argued that Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto was the key document in
the formation of post-Reform Bill politics. With its emphasis on the necessity and acceptance of
reform and gradual change, Gash argued, Peel was attempting to create a party and an ideology
to occupy the political center and appeal to the new electorate.8
Gash’s interpretation of Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws has been one of the most
hotly contested pieces of Gash’s analysis of Peel’s political legacy. Gash’s central argument
concerning Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws was that Peel made the choice after a
‘conversion’ to free trade in 1845.9 This, Gash argued, was part of Peel’s pragmatic politics and
his belief that his party must accept gradual change if it hoped to continue as a governing party.
Gash argued that Peel’s failure to contain Protectionist elements within his party ultimately
fueled the split of 1846. Gash's argument for Peel’s pragmatic reasons to repeal the Corn Laws
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was part of his general thesis that the politics of Peel were successful, and they were the way of
the future.
Gash’s highly detailed analysis of Peel’s politics and legacy has remained a dominant
force in the historiography. His argument was that the ‘Age of Peel’ was one of both moderation
and pragmatism. These interpretations of Peel as a political pragmatist have been severely
criticized by other historians, particularly those that have also investigated the entire political
career of Peel and arrived at very different conclusions.
Boyd Hilton’s article, ‘Peel: A Reappraisal,’ suggested that rather than being the
originator of a Conservative idea, as Gash had indicated, Peel was actually the originator of a
certain brand of Liberalism. Hilton argues that Peel was not a pragmatic centrist but rather a rigid
doctrinaire leader bound by his own ideology.10 He claimed that Peel’s efforts during the
‘liberal’ Tory era to pursue reforms, both civil and economic, suggest that his later ‘conversion’
to free trade was never a conversion at all.11 In Hilton’s interpretation, Peel’s Tamworth
Manifesto continued these trends of ‘liberal’ thinking and Peel’s continued ‘liberal’ Tory outlook
extended well into his second ministry. Hilton’s revision to the historiography of Robert Peel
has not been without challenges. Recent works have suggested that Gash’s view of Peel as a
pragmatic centrist have not been completely overturned by Hilton’s portrayal of Peel as a rigid
doctrinaire.12 Rather it seems that Peel’s earliest influences had made him a bit of both. Recent
works have turned to an evaluation of both camps when examining Peel from Tamworth up to
the time of the Corn Law crisis. An investigation into Peel’s early political career indicates that
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he may not have been the flexible centrist as portrayed by many in the historiography, but rather
was an idealist whose exposure to the ‘liberal’ Tory ideas of his youth shaped his own particular
form of conservativism.
Paul Adelman’s work Peel and the Conservative Party defines this new era of politics
using Gash’s term the ‘Age of Peel’ (1834-1846). Marking them as a crucial start to the new era
of mass political change, Adelman argues that Peel’s ideas redefined British politics. Peel’s
acceptance of the new type and system of politics that emerged after the Great Reform Bill of
1832 started with his creation of a new political party, the Conservatives. Peel’s ideas for
Conservative party politics were organized and presented to the nation through his Tamworth
Manifesto of 1834. This act of national publication was portrayed by Adelman as a deliberate
appeal to the newly enfranchised middle classes. In effect this was the first salvo in the battle for
national party and voter mobilization.13 As Peel reiterated many times “we [the Conservative
party] are not separated by any line of interest or any other line of demarcation from the middle
classes”.14 Adelman uses this language from Peel to show that a new form of electoral political
mobilization had begun.
Politics during the Age of Peel, as Adelman suggests, climaxed with Peel’s decision to
repeal the Corn Laws. Peel’s repeal of the Corn Laws (1846), Adelman argued, was the result of
political rather than economic reasoning.15 He noted that Peel’s decision, although unpopular
with many Conservatives, was actually made in order to preserve the traditional powers of the
aristocracy. Citing Peel’s earlier modifications to the Corn Laws (1842-3), Adelman stated that
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Peel had been attempting a careful balancing act between his party and those opposed to the
Corn Laws for quite some time. Peel’s modifications were careful reforms that were again, more
political than economic in design. He had hoped to yield a little ground to moderate opponents
of the Corn Laws without sacrificing so much as to upset the Protectionists within his
party.16These ideas of careful reform had been the backbone of his Conservativism, which
Adelman argued was somewhat pragmatic. Debates between Peel and his Conservative back
benchers over the Corn Laws illustrated a schism in Conservativism that had existed ever since
the organization of the Conservative party in 1834. Despite the profound division that had
emerged after 1846, the ideas of Peel lived on in the Peelite party. Adelman concluded his
argument in a similar fashion to Gash, suggesting that the “Age of Peel’ had been one of
moderation and pragmatism.
Robert Stewart’s works The Politics of Protection: Lord Derby and the Protectionist
Party 1841-1852 and The Foundation of the Conservative Party 1830-1867 tackle the central
issue of Conservative division during the fight to repeal the Corn Laws. He argues that the
Conservative party started by Peel in 1834 had a series of internal divisions that would
eventually shatter the party in 1846. These divisions among ‘conservative’ thinkers highlighted
the fact that the party started by Peel had not yet established a firm political identity or ideology
beyond its initial opposition to Whig radicalism. His work The Foundation of the Conservative
Party argues that the Conservative division, occasioned by the Corn Law crisis, forced the
remaining conservatives to create a new direction for themselves following Peel’s ‘betrayal’ in
1846. He argues that while the Protectionists and Peelites were remarkably similar in their
origins, they approached the idea of free trade very differently. Stewart argues that although
external pressure from the public and the ACLL was important, it was internal changes in the
16
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Conservative party that drove it to split in 1846. He argued that the Protectionists did not see the
Corn Laws so much as a long-term economic plan but as a link between the landed interest and
the unwritten British constitution.17
The Protectionists have often been portrayed in the history of Corn Law politics as
economic illiterates who rejected the new ideas of free trade in favor of the old system of
mercantilism. Stewart argues the Protectionists were all too cautious concerning the idea of free
trade and looked to the past for what suited the country best. They did not claim that corn would
be cheaper in Britain than other places. As many of the skeptics of free trade argued, they were
not willing to let Manchester prosper at the expense of Coventry.18 Stewart’s argument
concerning the Protectionists suggests that histories built around a League based telling of events
have cemented Conservative Protectionists into the role of villains. While many Protectionists
did question the economic value of repeal of the Corn Laws the majority were far more
concerned with the position of the aristocracy in the state. For them, repeal was more about
politics than economics.
Anna Gambles’ article “Rethinking the Politics of Protection: Conservatism and the Corn
Laws, 1830-1852” and her book Protection and Politics: Conservative Economic Discourse,
1815-1852 investigate the Conservative approach to economic issues during the Age of Peel and
the Conservative split. She argues that during the Corn Law crisis the Conservatives had
legitimate concerns about the rapid conversion to free trade. Conservative support for reforms to
the financial system such as the Bank Charter Act of 1833 and 1844, illustrated the party’s
willingness to adapt and modernize. These acts developed a more ‘liberal’ financial system with
17
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the printing and expansion of Bank of England paper currency. Gambles argued that the ‘liberal’
financial reforms were undertaken by the Conservative Peel ministry to not only stabilize the
currency but also to reinforce the role of state.19 She also drew the link to the ‘liberal’ Tory
ideology of the 1820s when it came to reforming aspects of financial institutions. To that effect
she argued that Peel’s Conservative government was willing to support banking reforms, not
only because it reinforced protectionism, but also because the Conservatives genuinely believed
the reforms would make the banking system work better.
Gambles suggested that previous histories, as well as League propaganda, were wrong to
label the Protectionists as economic ignoramuses.20 Her argument stems from a critique of the
histories written by the Anti-Corn Law League that often questioned the intellectual ability of the
Protectionists to grasp contemporary economics.21 She instead argued that the debate between
the two Conservative factions was an argument about the role of the state and the aristocracy
well beyond the simple application of the Corn Laws. The Protectionists argued that the state
(especially the landed classes) had a legitimate position in the economy through rights
guaranteed in the constitution.22 Additionally, Gambles argues that the defenders of the Corn
Laws were well aware that total repeal would not drastically lower the price of bread as the
League’s propaganda suggested.23 They were also well aware of the importance of
manufacturing to the British economy and had embraced it. She states these facts to support her
19
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argument that the Corn Law debate was about more than simple economics. Yet, as Stewart
suggested, the Protectionists were not willing to destroy certain elements of the British economy
(namely agriculture) just to allow another to flourish. Gambles’ argument as to why the
Protectionists supported the Corn Laws suggests that it was for political rather than economic
reasons. An effort, the Protectionists were against repeal primarily because they thought repeal
was not a reform but rather a fundamental change to a vital state institution. Therefore, Peel’s
repeal of the Corn Law ran counter to accepted Conservative principles, thus fueling the political
split. 24
Bruce Coleman’s work Conservatism: and the Conservative Party in the Nineteenth
Century discusses the origins of Conservativism after 1832 and the challenges that arose from
the Corn Law crisis. Although Coleman’s work was concerned with the long run of the
Conservative party in the 19th century, his emphasis on its formative years stress the importance
behind the reorganization of Tory forces after the Reform Bill. Coleman states that Peel’s vision
for a union of ‘conservatives’ was equal parts revival and reinvention. He argues that when Peel
used the term ‘Conservative,’ he was making a clear declaration to conserve the Constitution and
the institutions of the state that were attached to it.25
Coleman’s analysis of the Conservative party under the leadership of Robert Peel argued
that Peel had been working on creating a political party that would act on behalf of the nation
rather than just select members of society.26 This notion of Conservativism would be later
expanded under future Conservative Prime Ministers after the resignation of Peel. Coleman, like
24
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other historians of the Conservative party, claims that Disraeli more than Peel created the
modern Conservative party. However, Coleman was not willing to diminish the legacy of Robert
Peel, arguing that Peel’s initiative in adapting to the Reform Bill helped to save and modernize
Toryism and start to transform it into Conservativism.27 Coleman, much like Gash, sees the
Conservative party’s adaptability, inclusiveness, and attempted modernization, after 1834, as the
essential foundation on which the Conservative idea would develop.
Travis Crosby’s Sir Robert Peel’s Administration 1841-1846 takes an investigative
approach to the successes and failures of Peel’s Conservative party during his second
administration. Dealing with an increasingly sophisticated electorate Peel’s party dealt with
issues of both political and economic reform that at times tested his Conservative idea.28 Crosby
notes that Peel’s government pursued modifications to the Corn Laws, the financial system and
the Church with relatively little Tory obstruction. While each of these reforms was undertaken
in a progressive way many within Peel’s government were by no means active social
reformers.29 Crosby, like Gash, argues that Peel and his Conservative party were pragmatic
centrists that used reform to weigh the balance of issues against one another. The division caused
by the decision to repeal the Corn Laws, Crosby argues, was an act that Peel saw as a necessity
to maintain order and social stability between the industrial middle classes and the landed elite.30
Although Peel left the office of Prime Minister with a divided party, his legacy would
outlive his defeat. Peel’s refusal to accept any form of leadership of the Peelites signaled his
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refusal to accept a total and final division of the Conservative Party he had created.31 Crosby
argues that Peel’s political failure was due to the fact the he had underestimated the strength of
the Protectionist cause within his party and that this failure to recognize such a strong dissonance
cost him greatly. Peel and the Peelites became supportive of the Whig party and Whig notions of
free trade but refused an all-out merger with the Whig party. The legacy of the second Peel
ministry, with its attention to careful reforms, both political and economic, would serve as a
model for future governments’ reforms and economic responsibilities.32
The most recent analysis of Peel’s forty-year career was Richard A. Gaunt’s 2010 work,
Sir Robert Peel: The Life and Legacy. Gaunt draws from a huge collection of Peel’s writings to
help unwrap the troubling historgraphical legacy of the man. The question that has troubled
historians since Gash’s mid-20th century analysis is this: was Peel a pragmatic centrist and
Conservative modernizer of the Tory party or a rigid doctrinaire of a certain brand of
liberalism?33 Gaunt’s argument suggests that the persistent suspicions that surround Peel’s
politics have evolved with the analysis of Peel’s forty-year political career. His start as a Tory
defender of the established Church and opponent of Catholic emancipation (so much so he
earned the nickname “Orange Peel”) critiques Gash’s argument that Peel was a pragmatic
centrist. In relation to his change of heart over Catholic emancipation, Gaunt, like Hilton, argues
that Peel’s vision of Conservativism was focused on embracing timely, practical, and necessary
reforms without compromising on larger principles.34 However, unlike Hilton, Gaunt argued that
Peel’s politics in the 1820s did not lead to his ‘conversion’ to free trade ideas, but it was rather a
31
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period in which he formed his political ideology. Gaunt’s work illustrates the ongoing
historiographical problem with Peel, the Conservative party and the repeal of the Corn Laws; the
problem that has plagued the histories of this subject since Gash’s 1953 interpretation. This
study suggests that it is essential to conduct both a reevaluation of Peel’s politics and an
investigation into his conservative consistencies in the pursuit of reform. It will challenge the
previously observed interpretations that Peel’s politics were neither that of a political pragmatist
nor that of a rigid doctrinaire.
As most of the historians discussed above have suggested, Peel’s Conservativism was a
flexible pragmatic ideology with the goal of bringing the old Tory party to the political center.
Arguing that Peel was an outstanding politician and statesman, driven by practical necessity over
the course of his political life, has forced the historiography to focus on Peel’s political changes
rather than his consistencies. However, as Hilton argued in his re-evaluation of Peel, his political
experiences in the 1820s were extremely influential on his later decisions and in his construction
of the Conservative party. Hilton argued that Peel’s politics constituted a firm continuation of
‘liberal’ Toryism and that Peel’s consistencies were clear evidence of that ‘liberal’ Tory
ideology. However, as this thesis shall demonstrate, Peel’s politics were driven by his own
unique ideological development, and were not entirely limited to the old ‘liberal’ Tory idea.
Tamworth Conservativism, as imagined by Peel in 1834, was a product of his own time, political
upbringing and of his own unique and evolving perspective on what constituted the ‘national
interest.” These were the factors that would influence his political decisions for the remainder of
his life. His creation of the Conservative party and his Conservativism were to follow these
lifelong principles. As many of these authors have suggested, Peel’s creation of a Conservative
idea was not an immediate or easy action. The division of the party in 1846 was fueled by
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internal discontent with Peel’s leadership and the perceived variability of Peel’s principles.
Unlike what these historians have argued this thesis shall show that Peel’s Conservativism
outlived both Peel and the Corn Law crisis of 1846. Ironically, the group of Conservatives that
emerged from the Corn Law crisis made it their objective to reinvent the party based on the
foundational principles of Robert Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism.

Sir Robert Peel in Historical Perspective
The historiographical debate over the formation of Peel’s Conservative party illustrates
that from 1834 or 1846 Peel and his Conservatives were making their own party for their own
age. Peel’s visions for the party after 1835 launched a new type of political discourse in British
politics. This new discourse centered on the preservation of state institutions (the church, crown,
and economy) via careful reforms. Additionally, it remains evident that the making of Peel’s
Conservative party and Conservativism must be understood in the context of the repeal of the
Corn Laws. This important event fundamentally separated Peel’s Conservative party from the
old Tory party and created a new political discourse. As this work will argue, this new political
discourse can only be fully understood by examining the ideas of Robert Peel with particular
reference to his ‘Tamworth’ Conservativism.35
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism was different from ‘Conservative’ ideas of the past.
That is to say Peel’s Conservative approach was a product of both his time and of his personal
character. In his numerous biographies (both recent and older works which remain
historiographicly significant) Peel and his Conservative idea are typically traced to his family
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origins. Peel was born in 1788 to the textile industrialist and parliamentarian Robert Peel (1st
Baronet). Peel, as his biographer Norman Gash memorably writes, was born “to the world of
Gibbon and Joshua Reynolds, of stage-coaches, highwaymen and the judicial burning of women,
[but]died in 1850 in the age of Faraday and Darwin, of Punch, railway excursions, trade unions
and income tax.”36 Peel’s politics were a direct product of this transformative era. His Tamworth
Conservativism would be designed to take the world of his youth and transition it, and the
institutions that accompanied it, into the modern age. Peel followed his father into politics in
1809 as an MP for the rotten Irish borough of Cashel. Sponsored by his father and the Duke of
Wellington, the man who would become arguably the greatest reformer of the nineteenth century
ironically began his political career through the operation of a corrupted electoral system.37
A youthful face in parliament, Peel, like his father, joined the Tory party as a follower of
the ideas of William Pitt the younger.38 Pitt had identified often as an independent Whig, and it is
of some significance that the branch of the Tory party to which both the younger and elder Peel
gave their allegiance, evolved from this particular branch of Whiggism. As Richard Gaunt
argues, Peel’s apprenticeship in the Tory party was in many ways an unfortunate circumstance.
His assumption that Peel would have excelled in the Whig party suggests a strong element of
‘liberalism’ within the young Tory. Historians have long argued and debated whether or not Peel
was a ‘liberal’ wolf in Tory sheep’s clothing.39 However, it is difficult to accept that before 1832
Peel can be seen as a great reformer. Some historians have maintained that Peel’s sponsors, both
his father and the Duke of Wellington, had guided him into the Tory party and he had to repay
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the favor with loyalty. This argument is heavily debated. Peel’s patrons may have expected a
return on their investment, however, Peel’s change of heart, in 1829, with his support of Catholic
emancipation contradicts this suspicion. His ‘betrayal’ over Catholic emancipation illustrated
Peel’s loyalty was not to his patrons but rather to his conscience. The long debated origins of
Peel’s own form of Conservativism began at this point when he made the decision that to press
for the political rights of Catholics as a reform, was necessary for the security of the state in
Britain and Ireland.40
Peel’s first speech in parliament (an 1810 reply to the King’s speech) met with great
applause and caught the attention of leading Tory members as it was noted as “the best first
speech since that of William Pitt”.41 Peel’s early entrance into high politics was regarded as
successful and he was labeled as a person of interest. Noting his strong speaking ability MP’s
recognized why Wellington had chosen to support the young Robert Peel. Although his
contemporaries did not see the younger Peel as a traditional Tory, he was welcomed into the
party as the face of the next generation of Tories. Peel’s entrance into politics through the Tory
party has been a point of debate amongst historians. Some have argued that both Peel and his
father were following the ideas of Pitt rather than mainstream Toryism. This has led to the theory
that both Peels had a certain ‘liberal’ leaning despite their outward allegiance to the Tory party.
The true nature of Peel’s early political beliefs may never really be understood but the type of
politics that he would develop in his youth would shape his designs for a new political
organization.
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The historiography concerning the origins of Peel’s Conservativism often highlights the
era of Lord Liverpool’s ‘liberal’ Tory administration (1822-1827) as a precursor to the
Conservative party. Referred to as the ‘liberal’ Tory era the Liverpool administration presided
over a period of reform and progress, shaping Peel’s early perceptions that Toryism, especially
‘liberal’ Toryism, was the true legacy of Pitt and Burke.42 Historians have argued that this era,
and the figures that would emerge from it, became rising stars in British politics and the leading
political thinkers of the early Victorian era. Peel’s involvement in Liverpool’s government
earned him the position of Home Secretary in 1822. As Home Secretary, Peel clearly saw the
necessity of certain types of reform. Working on liberalizing criminal law and organizing an
early police force, Peel arguably was, as Gaunt suggests, an active ‘liberal’ Tory.43 Many of
these ideas in the more recent works suggest that Peel was not so much the pragmatic centrist
that Gash had originally cast him. Hilton’s interpretation of Peel’s politics argued that Peel was
more connected to a certain set of ideas than a pragmatic reaction to the changes of the
nineteenth century. Following Hilton’s argument, it appears that Peel maintained a certain series
of principles throughout his life that were extremely important to the formation of the
Conservative party and his Conservativism.

***
Historians of Peel have almost universally acknowledged the origins of the Conservative
party in Peel’s 1834 Tamworth Manifesto. While his manifesto remained central to his politics
the ideas that sparked Peel’s own Conservatism can be traced back to the era of ‘liberal’ Toryism
(1822-1827). The two major schools of historiographical thought concerning Peel’s complex,
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reserved personality contests whether Peel was a pragmatist or a rigid doctrinaire. These schools
have investigated Peel’s entire political career from his first speech in Parliament to his last and
have come to very different conclusions about his political ideology. As this study will
demonstrate, Peel’s early political career within the ‘liberal’ wing of the Tory party was essential
in forming his early political beliefs. His early politics and challenges, especially his decision on
Catholic emancipation, would play a fundamental role in shaping his Conservativism. Unlike
the works of previous historians this investigation shall argue that Peel’s politics and attitudes
could be traced to the ‘liberal’ Tory era and evolved with Peel to become his Tamworth
Conservativism. This Conservativism, derived from Peel’s own politics, would come to reshape
the Tory party and create a new direction for politics for the remainder of the century. The
Conservative party, grounded in the ideas of Peel’s Conservativism, would outlast a number of
crises during Peel’s leadership. When the party was divided in 1846 its new leaders would
return to the ideas of Peel’s Conservativism to reinvigorate Toryism for a second time.

20

CHAPTER II
REFORMED TOYRISM AND THE EARLY FORMATION OF CONSERVATIVISM
Since the turn of the 19th century Toryism had been defined by its defense of the
establishment, most specifically the crown, the church, and the aristocracy. During the 1820s,
under the leadership of Lord Liverpool, Toryism evolved into what historians have labeled as
‘liberal’ Toryism. In political terms the ‘liberal’ Tory era was defined by a series of reforms to
state institutions and by the success of Toryism electorally. However, the success of ‘liberal’
Toryism was short lived. After the death of Lord Liverpool in 1827 the succeeding Tory
governments failed to continue the policies that made Liverpool’s government successful. The
electoral collapse of the Tories after the passage of the Great Reform Bill of 1832 had opened
parliament to a new era of Whig government. Facing political crisis, the Tory remnants had to
reevaluate their own politics, most notably how to approach the idea of reform after the passage
of the Reform Bill. Therefore, to enter into the post-Reform Bill era the Tories had to reinvent
themselves and Toryism in order to survive as a political organization. A new generation would
emerge after the death of Lord Liverpool to take the leadership of his ‘liberal’ Tory legacy and
the larger legacy of Pitt and Burke.
Robert Peel orchestrated the reorganization of Toryism after the passage of the Reform
Bill thereby creating the political organization that would succeed Toryism. This idea would be
called Conservativism. However, reorganizing Toryism and transforming it along Peel’s own
principles into Conservativism was a difficult task for Peel to manage. To initiate these changes
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Peel would have to convince his party that the reforms they had opposed in the recent past
(Catholic emancipation, the Great Reform Bill) had to be accepted. Peel would call upon his
experience in the Liverpool government and the reforms he had spearheaded as examples of the
types of reforms the new Conservative party should undertake. It was Robert Peel’s own political
ideology, based in ‘liberal’ Toryism that would be used to transition Toryism into a political
ideology for post-Reform Bill Britain.

Toryism into Conservatism and the Tamworth Manifesto
The formation of modern conservativism actually predated the origins of Robert Peel’s
party in 1834. As the historiography suggests, the origins of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism
stretched back to the so-called ‘liberal’ Tory period. The government of Lord Liverpool (18221827) dominated this era of Tory success. The Tory governments before the Reform Bill,
especially Liverpool’s, had seen much success in both electoral and popular terms. However, the
‘liberal’ Toryism that had developed during Liverpool’s administration was itself an attempt to
bring the party back to its roots in the ideas of the much-respected William Pitt the Younger, the
Whig turned Tory.
Liverpool’s ‘liberal’ Toryism had been marked by a belief in strong government
dedicated to economic prosperity through reform.44 Liverpool’s government had taken a
proactive approach to reform and had advocated for political and economic reforms as a way to
combat the growing calls from the working and middle classes. As Liverpool worked to return
the party to the ideas of Pitt, two factions emerged within the administration: the ‘liberal’ Tories
and reactionary Tories (or Ultras). The Ultra Tories were an extreme right wing faction of the
44
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Tory party, and staunch defenders of the Anglican Church. The Ultra faction came into
existence in the 1820s as Tory opponents to the ‘liberal’ polices of the Liverpool government.
Their role in the decline of Toryism climaxed in 1829 with the passage of Catholic emancipation.
The Ultra-Tories rejected the label of extreme or reactionary and saw themselves as the true
upholders of the Whig tradition of 1689.45 Conversely, the ‘liberal’ Tories thought of themselves
in the same fashion except with closer ties to Pitt the Younger who had supported Catholic
emancipation at the turn of the 19th century. These two factions were often at odds with each
other despite being part of the same government. Henry John Temple (Lord Palmerston)
described the tension between the two groups of Tories as problematic for the continuation of
Toryism. As he saw it, in 1826, the Ultras were reactionary forces that were determined to
prevent the party from returning to its roots:
in truth the real opposition of the present day sit behind the Treasury Bench; and
it is by the stupid old Tory party, who bawl out the memory and praises of Pitt
while they are opposing all the measures and principles which he held most
important46
John Henry Temple’s critique of the Ultras illustrated that while the party believed itself to be
the successors of the politics of Pitt the Ultras were undermining his legacy.
The passage of ‘liberal’ Pitt-like reforms sponsored by the Liverpool administration was
an effort to remove a negative stigma from Toryism; a stigma that was associated with the
repression of the lower orders by the aristocracy. Reforms to criminal law with the Gaols Act of
1823, introduced by Home Secretary Robert Peel, reformed the prison system by introducing
payment of jailers and the prohibition of irons. Additionally, Peel’s reforms to criminal law
45
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extended to the reduction of the number of capital offences and a significant reduction in
executions.47 Furthermore, key economic reforms were undertaken by the Liverpool
government. The relaxation of the Navigation Acts in 1823 reduced colonial trade restrictions
and a gradual reduction of duties in 1825 helped to stimulate economic growth and
employment.48 Reforms undertaken by the Liverpool government and Robert Peel have been
argued to be liberal in their nature, however they were actually more ‘conservative’, that is to
say, they worked within the existing system to make it work more efficiently rather than to
change it fundamentally. Peel’s reforms to the criminal justice system and Liverpool’s relaxation
of the Navigation Acts were indeed reforms that had lasting consequences but did not tackle the
larger constitutional issues.
Despite the successes of the ‘liberal’ Tory government, Liverpool’s administration was
often at war with itself. Ultra Toryism became highly problematic. This section of the party was
unwilling to compromise on reforms to the Church, Crown, the aristocracy, and the
constitution.49 Regardless, ‘liberal’ sections of the party pressed for careful reforms. In a letter
to the young Robert Peel, Irish statesman John Wilson Croker argued that while the public
clamored for reform it should be undertaken carefully.50While the ‘liberal’ Toryism of Lord
Liverpool appears to be a precursor to Peel’s Conservative party, with its belief in careful
reform, the reluctance on behalf of the party leadership to pursue larger parliamentary reforms
prevented ‘liberal’ Toryism from evolving. Its failures to make any efforts at larger constitutional
47
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changes such as Pitt had tried in 1801 further damaged the party.51 In essence, the ‘liberal’ Tory
party prolonged the survival of Toryism until 1832 rather than letting it die at the hands of the
Ultra reactionaries in the 1820s.
The death of Lord Liverpool, in 1827, began a change in the politics of the ‘liberal’
Tories. He was succeeded by the ‘liberal’ Tory, George Canning. Canning’s administration was
plagued by a more heated division between Ultras and ‘liberals’. Canning’s government, unlike
Liverpool’s, did not have the support of the Ultra Tories and was forced to draw in more support
from the Whig party. This further distanced Canning from political moderates like Robert Peel,
who subsequently resigned from the office of Home Secretary. Canning’s tenure as Prime
Minster ended after only 119 days with his death on August 8th 1827. His replacement was the
unlikeable Viscount Goderich (Lord Ripon). Like Canning, Goderich’s term as PM was also
destined to be quite short, lasting only 144 days, over the course of which he managed to earn the
hatred of both the Ultras and the ‘liberal’ Tories. Goderich was summed up by King George IV
as “a damned, sniveling, blubbering blockhead.”52 While Goderich was the de jure leader of the
party the real power was in the hands of the Duke of Wellington and Robert Peel, a rising star
within the party. The two brief ministries of Canning and Goderich illustrated the crisis within
‘liberal’ Toryism as to who would succeed Liverpool and take the mantle of the liberal Tories.
Goderich’s resignation in 1828 was widely welcomed and he was succeeded by the Duke of
Wellington.
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Wellington’s government (1828-1830) undertook serious reforms to both the state and
economy that the previous Liverpool government had avoided. Wellington had every opportunity
to bring the Ultra Tories back into power, but the first person he chose for his cabinet was Robert
Peel. With Peel in the all-important position of Home Secretary Wellington chose the remainder
of his ministers carefully; seeking to balance the forces of the Ultras and the ‘liberal’ Tories.
Significantly, the first reforms undertaken by Wellington were modifications to the Corn Laws.
The economic reforms of the Liverpool government had avoided the Corn Laws specifically as
Liverpool did not wish to revive the type of agitation that had occurred earlier, most notably at
Peterloo in 1819.53 Reforms to the Corn Laws had to be undertaken as they caused the price of
Corn to remain artificially high even as the nation sank deeper and deeper in the economic
depression that had begun in 1815. The introduction of a ‘sliding scale’ was designed to lower
the price of Corn and to continually adjust the tariff to the market price. With the introduction of
the sliding scale in 1828 some foreign grain would be allowed into the British market. The need
for modification was clear because the previous exclusionary price of 80s per quarter had
artificially driven up the price of corn. The introduction of a sliding scale allowed the duty free
importation of grain when the domestic price reached 72s per quarter. These changes were fully
supported by many within the government and seen as a necessary reform.54 Modifications to the
Corn Laws represented a ‘conservative’ approach to reform with evidence of a ‘liberal’ Tory
economic mindset. This modification in 1828 illustrated the developing mind-set of modern
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Conservativism as it was undertaken to make an existing “institution” work more efficiently
rather than to change it fundamentally.
The next major reform the Wellington administration undertook was Peel’s notable
Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 (10 Geo. 4, C.44). This 1829 Act established the Metropolitan
Police of London replacing the old system of constables. Similar to his reforms to criminal law
in 1823 and 1825 his reforms to policing were the first piece of legislation ushering in a police
force that would serve as a model for cities around the country. Peel’s police force, often called
‘bobbies’ or ‘peelers’, was designed to wear uniforms and interact with the public. Peel had
argued against the use of ununiformed police or spies and informants. In the debate over
criminal law Peel argued, “God forbid that I should mean to countenance a system of espionage;
but a vigorous preventive police, consistent with the free principles, of our free constitution, was
an object which I did not despair of seeing accomplished.”55 When Peel set up the Metropolitan
Police in 1829 he wanted the public to see the police as a visible presence of the state through
which criminal law was being enforced for the good of the nation.
However, the most pressing issue of Wellington’s government was the issue of Catholic
emancipation. Although the idea of emancipation had been around since before the Act of Union
with Ireland in 1800, the issue had been extremely divisive. Pitt the Younger had fought for
Catholic emancipation as part of the Act of Union in 1801. However, upon hearing that the King
(George III) would not support this, in part because it would violate his Coronation Oath, Pitt
resigned and his government collapsed.56 Since the collapse of Pitt’s ministry in 1801 the Tories
had refrained from pursuing any large parliamentary reforms on this issue. Matters changed
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after the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828 granted political rights to NonConformists. Although initially opposed by Peel and the Tories, the support of Anglican Church
leaders persuaded the government to pursue repeal.57 Following repeal of the Test and
Corporation Acts the issue of Catholic rights became a major point of debate within the Tory
party, with some fervently opposed to granting Catholics political rights. In 1828 the Irishman
Daniel O’Connell was elected to Parliament but could not take his seat in the House of
Commons as a practicing Catholic. O’Connell then campaigned to gather public support for the
emancipation of Catholics. While supporters of emancipation were primarily in the Whig party,
many Tories began to turn to support O’Connell’s campaign after a significant amount of public
support became evident. As Home Secretary, Robert Peel became instrumental in helping
Wellington’s government pass Catholic emancipation. While initially opposed to Catholic
emancipation (Peel had earned the nickname “Orange Peel” for his almost visceral opposition to
expanding the political rights of Catholics), after O’Connell’s national campaign had gathered
significant public support both Peel and the Duke of Wellington came to believe that if the nation
was against the exclusion of Catholics they must adhere to the national will and pass the reform.
Peel now viewed it as an absolutely necessary reform, for as he explained to Wellington, "though
emancipation was a great danger, civil strife was a greater danger."58Peel had observed the
growing tension in Ireland and believed that only by granting emancipation could a wholesale
rebellion be prevented. Peel’s close relationship with Wellington had also changed his positon
concerning emancipation and the passage of the act was finalized in 1829. Although both men
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originally opposed Catholic emancipation they became supporters of the reform because – in
their collective view – it had become necessary for the health and security of the nation.
The changing positon of both the Duke of Wellington and Robert Peel over Catholic
emancipation signaled a return to Pittite ideas. That is to say, reform when necessary. It was
during these debates over Catholic emancipation that Peel’s own particular form of
‘conservativism’ started to become independent of his ‘liberal’ Tory roots. Peel notes within his
own memoirs that other than the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) the fight to grant Catholic
political rights was the most defining moment in his political life. 59 With the passage of
Catholic emancipation, the balance of power in the House shifted towards the Whigs, which
would have profound implications for Britain’s political future, most notably in the form of the
Whig –sponsored legislation of 1832 and 1833.
The Great Reform Bill of 1832 created a fundamental shift in the political system despite
the relatively small expansion of the franchise. To many Tories it destroyed their conception of
a political system based around the Church, the aristocracy and the crown. The old system of
party organization and elections changed with the passage of the Great Reform Bill; patronage,
purchase, and favors were no longer central to any party’s political upkeep, as the monopoly
over political power was withdrawn from the aristocracy.60 Intense Tory opposition to the Bill
was felt in the next election with a crushing defeat to the party. In 1831 the Tories’ held 235
seats and the Whigs 370. After the election of 1832, the Tories held 175 seats and the Whigs
gained 71 seats bringing their total to 441. With the Tories’ defeat the Whigs possessed nearly
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three quarters of the total number of seats in the House of Commons.61 This crushing defeat for
the Tories was very troubling to the future of the party.62 Ongoing Tory opposition to the Reform
Bill illustrated a fundamental problem that manifested itself in the elections of 1832; more than
ever the Tories were associated with backwardness.
Refusal to accept what were widely viewed as much needed changes to the electoral
system lead to an overwhelming Whig victory in 1832. The Whig victory signaled a potentially
crippling and long-term defeat for Toryism and its supporters. From an Ultra Tory perspective
the factors that had contributed to this decline were the reforms passed in the 1820s, most
notably changes to the Corn Laws and relaxation of the Navigation Acts, the Repeal of the Test
and Corporation Acts, and finally Catholic emancipation. For Ultras each of these reforms,
although passed by the Tory party, had contributed to an erosion of key Tory state institutions.
This alleged erosion gave the Ultras fuel to strike against the Whig government and further
divide the party from within. The final blow to Toryism was the intense opposition to the Great
Reform Bill. By opposing the expansion of the franchise and the removal of corrupt boroughs the
Tories had aligned themselves with the forces of repression. The political chaos initiated by the
Reform Bill sent Toryism further on the path of self-destructive behavior. To combat these selfinflicted injuries, less reactionary Tories sought to return the party to what it resembled before
1832. The ‘liberal’ Tory faction of the party, lead informally by Peel, would work to undo the
recent failures of the party.
To transform Toryism, Peel and others had suggested a new name and label for the party
in the post-Reform Bill world. The transformative label that arose was ‘conservative’.
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‘Conservative’ had its first use by John Wilson Croker in an issue of the Quarterly Review in
1830 as a description of the Tory party.63 He and other Tory politicians had argued that in order
to create a stronger party they must work to preserve and ‘conserve’ the institutions of the state;
such as the rights of the Crown, the rights of the state church, and the rights of the landed class.
Croker’s term for the party crept slowly into favor and began to be utilized by other Tories as a
way to shift away from the now problematic Tory label. Conservativism would be about the
protection and conservation of the institutions of the state through reforms that would work
within the existing institution to preserve it rather than change it fundamentally or destroy it.
The formation of local ‘conservative’ associations after the Tory defeat in 1832 began to
bring Tories together to discuss the future of the party in a post-Reform Bill era. These
associations were founded along the lines of parliamentary constituencies and were funded by
local members. As Philip Salmon argued, the formation of these associations was inspired by
‘conservative’ thinking individuals who had evaluated the new electorate and consciously sought
newer methods to revive Toryism in the post Reform Bill era.64 Of these associations, the most
influential was the Carlton Club. The Carlton Club quickly became the central think tank of
‘conservative’ minded individuals. Salmon argues that the organization of the Club in 1832
began to help revive the Tory party from the ground up.65 The Carlton Club and like-minded
conservative associations after 1832 played a vital role in selecting Conservative candidates,
canvassing and financing the party. These ground level changes initiated by the Carlton Club
and other conservative associations played an important role in the transformation of Toryism
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into Conservativism. Their bottom-up redevelopment of Toryism after the Reform Bill meant
that the Tories themselves knew they had to change. While Peel remained the grand architect of
later Conservativism, the reorganization of the Tories from the ground level began with the local
political clubs.66
What was clear for the Tories after the passage of the Reform Bill was that the party had
to change and adapt if it were to survive in the new world of British politics. Croker’s
suggestion for a ‘conservative’ label and the formation of conservative clubs and associations
began a return to Pittite Toryism that started with Liverpool’s ‘liberal’ Tory era.67 However, to
change the electorate’s (as well as the public’s) perception of the Tory party from one of
repression to one that worked primarily to preserve state institutions, a new generation would
have to lead the charge. The figurehead for this transformation would be Robert Peel.
Peel’s leadership of the remaining Tories began with a recommendation from the Duke of
Wellington. With the dismissal of Lord Melbourne’s Whig government by King William IV in
late 1834, the Duke of Wellington was asked by the King to form a government. He declined the
offer; instead he suggested that the young star of the Tory party, Robert Peel, take the office of
Prime Minister.68 Wellington’s reluctance to take the office of PM and his endorsement of Peel
suggests that in his mind Peel would be a better candidate to revive Toryism. Whereas
Wellington represented the old Tory party, Peel was to be representative of something new.
Before Peel, the Tory party had been associated with the landed aristocrats, minor gentry and the
established Anglican Church. Peel, however, was an industrialist rather than a landlord and it
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was believed that his background outside of the traditional Tory realm would help lead to the
transformation and modernization that would turn the Tories into Conservatives.69
Peel’s first order of business was to explain what his polices would be as the first Tory to
take office since the passage of the Reform Bill. Upon accepting the call to take the office of
Prime Minister in early December of 1834 Peel drafted his platform, aptly named after his
constituency in Tamworth, the Tamworth Manifesto.70 Peel began to fundamentally change the
political discourse of British politics through this manifesto. Tamworth Conservativism, as
defined by Robert Peel, outlined the economic, political, and social arguments for the party as a
revitalization of Toryism. Peel’s Manifesto remains by far one of the most significant ideological
statements of early nineteenth century British politics. Delivered as a supposedly nonpartisan
speech on December 18, 1834, before his electors at the Borough of Tamworth, this manifesto
outlined the fundamental structures for his new Conservative party and ministry.71 Although
delivered to the electors at Tamworth, the main points were addressed to the electorate at large.
Peel realized that since the passage of the Reform Bill national politics had fundamentally
changed.72 With a national audience in mind Peel’s Manifesto outlined a new direction for the
Tories based on the reformed electorate.73 Peel’s idea of a national Conservative party was one
that could act on behalf of the nation regardless of levels of enfranchisement. The principles he
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enunciated in the new party canon centered on the maintenance and careful reform of the
traditional institutions of church, state, and economy.74
To simply change the name of the party from Tory to Conservative was not the goal.
Peel believed that a reformation of the Tory party into a ‘conservative’ one would be the best
way to combat radicalism and block radical Whig reforms.75 Additionally, Peel believed that
certain reforms were necessary and that his new party should carry out reforms that were in the
national interest. Peel believed that Toryism, especially the principles and polices that began
with ‘liberal’ Toryism, with its strong commitment to the state, church, crown and pursuit of
necessary reform, would be a firm base for his new party.76 His objective in designing the
Conservative party was to help maintain these important state organizations. It was, in Peel’s
opinion, the positon of the ministers of government to lead, not to follow.77 Peel argued that a
Conservative government would not be led by public opinion or party doctrine but rather by
what it considered to be in the best interests of the nation. Additionally he stated that the Tories’
refusal to pursue and accept reforms had essentially led them to extinction by sticking to a pure
party doctrine rather than working towards the larger national interest.78 Peel had argued that
Whig radicals had been strongly influenced by the press and public agitation; therefore, they
were following and adhering to the ‘vilest species of despotisms- the despotism of
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demagogues.’79 Clearly in his mind, a strong government or party should not unthinkingly bend
to the demands of the public or press. Conservative MP’s were to be representatives of the
electorate, responsible for making decision for the good of the whole, not party delegates told
how to vote.80 Since the passage of the Reform Bill Peel had criticized the Whigs for enacting a
host of unnecessary reforms, which did not truly help the nation.81 He argued that by following
the public’s demands for immediate action the Whigs were undermining the constitution. His
objective was to create a Conservative party that would help preserve and conserve crucial state
institutions and work for the national interest.
Peel’s argument for a Conservative government suggested that it had to be accepting of
reforms already enacted and in some cases actively pursue further needed reforms. As Croker
had suggested to Peel more than a decade earlier, reforms should be undertaken, but carefully.82
This careful approach meant that state institutions could undergo careful review that could
inform well-constructed measures of reform. Peel argued that reforms were also to be opposed if
they were against national interests. Still, such opposition, Peel argued, had to be carefully
managed. The Conservative party should pick and choose its fights and selectively oppose
unnecessary measures.83 He argued that unnecessary reforms to state institutions were not only
dangerous but also irresponsible. This notion of selective opposition illustrated that Peel’s
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Conservative party was constructing a hierarchy of principles. Some things were of greater
importance than others and required strong defense. Therefore, Peel’s idea of a careful and
selective approach to reform established a basis on which the party could oppose or support
reforms to institutions of the state and serve as a basis for the ideology of Conservativism.
Changing the party name from Tory to Conservative was part of Peel’s attempt to create
not only a new image but an entirely new political discourse for the party. Peel’s objective was
not only to distance his new party from the narrow ideas of the old Tory party but also to
revitalize what he viewed as the positive elements of Toryism; most notably its commitment to
national institutions of church and state. Peel had no time for the Ultras and his dislike of them
ran deep. He argued that their narrow-mindedness and failure to look at the interests of the
nation were not only damaging but also distressing.84His party’s design, outlined in the
Manifesto, was to conserve the institutions of the state and guide them into the future.85
The Manifesto directly outlined the general goals and directions of Peel’s first
government.86 However, his manifesto would have consequences that went far beyond outlining
the objectives of a single ministry. The manifesto dictated four critical aims that were designed
to appeal to the new electorate in the post-Reform Bill era. These four principles were:
acceptance of the Reform Bill as irrevocable; a willingness to pursue further needed reforms,
both civil and ecclesiastical; the preservation of the church; and a refusal to accept reforms that
were unnecessary or so radical they undermined the very nature of British society.
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The first and most crucial section of the Manifesto was Peel’s explicit support for the
Reform Bill, stating that it was an irrevocable piece of legislation.87 Peel’s stance on the Reform
Bill in the manifesto clearly defined his political position from then on. Declaring that with the
passage of the Reform Bill British politics had entered a new era, Peel argued that it was the
responsibility of the Prime Minister to both maintain the Bill and act in the spirt of it. This first
section of Peel’s manifesto clearly articulates his ‘liberal’ Tory attitudes and dislike of Ultra
Toryism:
Now I say at once that I will not accept power on the condition of declaring
myself an apostate from the principles on which I have heretofore acted. At the
same time, I never will admit that I have been, either before or after the Reform
Bill, the defender of abuses, or the enemy of judicious reforms.88
Peel’s alignment with the Reform Bill illustrated his commitment to modernizing the Tories in
line with the new age of politics. Peel argued that the Bill had settled the issue of corruption in
politics in a positive fashion and that any attempts by either Conservatives or Whigs to undo its
work would be against the national interest.89 Aligning himself with the Reform Bill Peel made it
clear that the new and enlarged national electorate was his party’s target audience.
Second, Peel argued for his Conservatives to review state institutions in the “spirit” of the
Reform Bill. He argued that:
[I]f the spirit of the Reform Bill implies merely a careful review of institutions,
civil and ecclesiastical, undertaken in a friendly temper combining, with the firm
maintenance of established rights, the correction of proved abuses and the redress
of real grievances, - in that case, I can for myself and colleagues undertake to act
in such a spirit and with such intentions.90
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Peel’s Manifesto addressed the notion of reform both civil and ecclesiastical but also clearly
stated that it would be limited in its extent. He stated that the Reform Bill did not require a
massive overhaul of the state but a series of careful reviews.91 Review and then reform to state
institutions both civil and ecclesiastical broke with the old idea of Toryism and its unyielding
opposition to changing state institutions in any way, shape or form. As a reflection of his own
Conservativism Peel had argued that his government would have to be proactive and enact
change where there was both a perceived need and a strong case for change.92 Similar to his
involvement in the debate over Catholic emancipation in 1829, Peel believed that the best way to
maintain both the authority of the Church and state was through reform that addressed the
grievances of the nation.93
Third, he wanted his reformed Tory party to stand for the active preservation and
improvement of current institutions. Thus, his positon on the Anglican Church in Ireland was to
reform the institution of the church so it could be better promoted. 94 His offer to investigate the
possibility of church reform to preserve the interests of the established church satisfied his Tory
base but also acted within the spirit of the post-Reform Bill era. Peel imagined his party could,
through careful and well thought out measures of reform, guide state institutions into the present
and promote their interests.
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Finally, Peel argued that while his administration was in support of necessary reforms it
would not undertake sweeping reforms that were fueled by unthinking, popular mass agitation.
Peel had stated that if the positive spirit of the Reform Bill was to degenerate into an atmosphere
of continual agitation and demands for massive and sweeping reforms he could not support it. 95
Peel’s final point in the Manifesto conceived his intent to establish a modern government that
could act for the good of the entire nation, regardless of the level of enfranchisement. Although
seemingly democratic, Tamworth Conservativism wasn’t. His Conservativism was about the
maintenance and preservation of state institutions and pursuit of reforms that worked within the
existing system to address problems and correct them for the good of the nation.
The overall message in Peel’s Manifesto was to accept reforms for the good of the nation.
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism had to take into account the changes instituted by the Reform
Bill and had to embrace them as irrevocable and necessary for the party’s transition from
Toryism into Conservativism.96 The ideas addressed in the Manifesto, inspired by the Reform
Bill, represented Peel’s notion of a Conservative government. “Conservative government” as
Peel had called it, reflected his intentions to govern in the spirt of reformed ‘liberal’ Toryism.
Aligning himself with the spirit of the Reform Bill Peel made it clear that the newly reconstituted
and enhanced national electorate was his party’s target audience. Obstructive opposition by the
Ultra Tories after the passage of the Reform Bill had brought the party to the brink of extinction.
Peel had observed these problems and offered cautious reforms as a compromise to revitalize the
party, while still maintaining support of state institutions. Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism took
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into account the changes instituted by the Reform Bill and actually embraced them as a means of
evolution.97
The ideas set forth in the Manifesto presented Peel’s vision of a Conservative
government. By accepting the ideals behind the Reform Bill, Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism
launched a new political discourse. The new Conservative party was one that embraced the
Reform Bill as irrevocable and believed that attempts to undo it were threats to the peace and
security of the nation.98 Peel clearly saw himself and his new Conservative Party as the
ideological successors of ‘liberal’ Toryism, because it too had accepted cautious reform in the
1820s. Drawing from the fundamental basis of ‘liberal’ Toryism the Manifesto sought to draw in
all but the most reactionary of Tories, who after 1834, had to either join Peel’s party or fade into
political oblivion.99
The government that started with the Tamworth Manifesto was to operate in a new
Conservative fashion. Peel’s first ministry was a minority government and had to rely on Whig
support. However, the Whigs who supported Peel were often skeptical of his Tory background
and because of this Peel could never be certain of their support; indeed, the Whig supporters of
Peel’s government eventually broke off and joined with the Irish radicals to defeat Peel’s
government.100 By early April 1835, Peel could no longer continue his minority government and
reluctantly resigned, allowing Lord Melbourne and the Whigs to return to office.
Although the first Peel ministry lasted only one hundred days, it had created the
foundation for a new political organization. The collapse after one hundred days in office
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illustrated the fragility of the newly organized party but in the long term helped to forge stronger
party discipline.101 The withdrawal into opposition gave Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism a
chance to evolve into a more detailed and well-defined party canon which in turn allowed for a
more fully articulated Conservative party ideology. Peel’s first ministry, although short, was a
relatively successful first test of Conservativism as a national party idea. In this sense, the
collapse of Peel’ first ministry was not really a failure but rather a case of a premature ascent to
power. The resignation of Conservative government ministers on April 8, 1835 was met with
cheers of support for Peel.102 Although defeated Peel had successfully rallied support for his new
Conservative idea. The first Conservative ministry ended in perhaps the best way possible for
Peel and his supporters. Peel’s Conservatives as well as his non-partisan supporters within the
House of Commons marched triumphantly to the opposition benches. As the session ended Peel
was met with cheers from both opponents and supporters all around the House.103 While Peel had
not had the numbers in 1835 to form a strong ministry, he had rallied the support necessary for
the formation of a strong opposition. It was evident that despite the party’s inability to hold on to
the reins of government it clearly had strong influence within parliament which was a vast
improvement over the years from 1832 to 1834 when the party had almost disappeared into
political irrelevancy.104 Peel’s move to the opposition benches allowed him and his follower’s
time to rally support, build internal ideology, identity, and to attract new members to the party.
In opposition, Tamworth Conservatism proved to be a successful basis for rallying more support
and strengthening the party ideology.
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Seen in that light, the first Peel ministry was a victory for the idea of Tamworth
Conservatism despite its short run. The immediate effects of the Manifesto were minimal.
However, the long-term ramifications of the manifesto were huge. The results of the elections of
1835 and 1837 showed a strong Conservative rise, which would continue into the elections of
1841 allowing Peel to form a majority government. The tenets of the Manifesto and his first
ministry helped to convince the electors around the country, and fellow Tories, that Peel could
and should be trusted as the leader of this new Conservative party. Peel had managed to revive
the still beating heart of Toryism and transform it into a new national idea– Conservatism. Peel
had not only revived the ideology from the brink but he had also successfully removed, or
restrained, many of the rotten branches associated with the most reactionary strains of Ultra
Toryism. Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism had passed the first test in establishing itself as a
viable political ideology and successor to ‘liberal’ Toryism. However, to expand the party, Peel
had to purge or at the very least further restrain the most reactionary forces in the party. His
ultimate solution was to dilute the influence of the Ultras by recruiting large numbers of
moderate Conservative converts and ex-Whigs to the Conservative party standard.

Converts to Peel’s Conservative Party: Edward Smith-Stanley and the Derby Dilly
Peel’s 1834 reformation of the Tories launched the new Conservative movement, but if
he was going to create a truly new type of political party he needed more than traditional Tory
support. It was imperative that he bring in ex-Whig members to his cause, largely to dilute the
continued threat of Ultra Toryism. High on the list of potential candidates for his new party was
Edward George Geoffrey Smith-Stanley. Lord Stanley’s role in the formation of the
Conservative party has often been underrated despite his later service as the leader of the party
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and Prime Minister. His alliance with Peel would help further Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism
as the official brand of Conservativism for the party.
Lord Stanley’s political career began in the Whig party and he was an active member of
Lord Grey’s government (1831) as Chief Secretary for Ireland (an office occupied twenty years
earlier by Robert Peel). As a more ‘conservative’ member of the Whig party Stanley had been a
cautious supporter of the Reform Bill to expand the franchise. However, the measure that broke
his confidence with the Whigs was the reform of the Church of Ireland. After 1832, he saw the
Whig’s as having fragmented into thousands of distinct factions with no real organization.105 His
exit from the Whigs was accompanied by that of fellow members of the Grey government Sir
James Graham, Lord George Bentinck, Lord Ripon106 and the Duke of Richmond.107 Together
these men rallied around Stanley and were called the Stanleyites, Dillyites or the Derby Dilly. 108
The Dillyites or the Derby Dilly was a reference to both Stanley as the future 14th Earl of Derby
and Dilly as slang for Diligence. These Conservative Whigs under Lord Stanley broke with the
Whig leader in the Commons, John Russell, over a perceived radicalization within the party.
Each of these ex-Whigs were logical targets for inclusion in Peel’s Conservative party because of
their (especially Lord Stanley’s) “adherence to the Conservative but yet liberal
principles.”109Stanley’s transformation into a Conservative was not a simple conversion but
rather was part of the larger reorganization of British politics after the passage of the Reform
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Bill. As a crucial part of the creation of Conservativism, Peel needed Stanley and other ex-Whigs
to broaden Conservativism beyond reformed Toryism.
The formation of Stanley’s Derby Dilly arose from his installation as Lord Rector of
Glasgow University on December 21st 1834. The political ideas that he articulated in his
installation speech became known as the Knowsley Creed.110 The creed advocated for
moderation, careful reform, and strong government. The publication of Peel’s Tamworth
Manifesto three days earlier on December 18th stole the thunder that Stanley was hoping to
capture by creating a center party. With Peel beating him to the punch, Stanley’s Knowsley
Creed had seemed more like an imitation of Peel’s support of moderate politics rather than the
creation of an original platform by Stanley.111 Peel’s Conservativism and Stanley’s Knowsley
Creed, were at their core, very similar. Both reflected the popular idea of necessary reform for
the good of the nation.
Both Peel and Stanley nationally published their speeches to express the message of a
moderate approach to reform. To the assembled crowd, Stanley stated that the spirit of
moderation prevailed around the country. 112 Moderation, selective reform, and the preservation
of state institutions were all key elements of Stanley’s beliefs, and like Peel, he articulated the
idea of a careful approach to reform. In the context of the post-Reform Bill era Stanley was
cautious of reforms and was well aware of Whig measures that targeted crucial state institutions.
It was his belief that these were not reforms but acts of willful destruction which had to be
blocked. As he put it, “I will oppose with all the might and energy of which I am capable those
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whose measure, whose objects, and whose intentions are not intended to reform, but to
destroy.”113 His argument was that, under the pretext of reform, members of the Whig party had
created ‘reforms’ that undermined the national interests and institutions. Stanley argued that
these should be opposed, as they were not actually reforms. However, Stanley was not opposed
to reform in the slightest. He remained committed to addressing grievances and correcting
systems of government to work more effectively.
While a strong supporter of the idea of reform Stanley, like Peel, suggested that if reform
was not undertaken with due consideration to the maintenance of crucial state institutions it
would be problematic. Additionally, Stanley argued that it would be impossible to engage in
reactionary reverses. Changes like the Great Reform Act were permanent: “On these principles it
was that I acted with the government of Earl Grey in favour of a reform.”114Unlike Peel, who had
originally opposed the Reform Bill, Stanley had always embraced its design of expanding the
franchise beyond the aristocracy. However, Stanley opposed the later reforms passed by the
Whigs as being excessive and counter to the protection of the core institutions of the state. The
reform that precipitated his and others exit from the Whig party dealt with the relationship of the
state church in Ireland. Stanley believed that the state and church was under attack across the
nation under the guise of reform. In his creed, he called for the preservation of these institutions
through continued maintenance.115 Stanley argued for a defense of the state church in the
following terms,
Are those the institutions which ought to be treated by Government with
indifference or non-interference? It ought to be the first duty of a Government to
113
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extend religious knowledge and see that the people by means of establishments
had the power of obtaining instruction and religious comfort.116
Stanley’s defense of the state church argued that it should be respected and maintained as a
central part of the country.
Still, the Knowsley Creed, unlike Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto, was not a founding party
document but a suggestion for new type of politics in a post Reform Bill era. His creed, like
Peel’s Manifesto expressed the new political atmosphere that was surrounding politics in the
wake of the Reform Bill. Stanley argued that the preservation of state institutions should be a
high priority. However as he argued in his creed,
These institutions are respected, and ought to be maintained and upheld in the
love and attention of the country; but while I say this, I am not blind to the defects
which at present exist, and which I am anxious to see removed- for by such means
do I wish to disarm our enemies, conciliate our opponents and increase our
friends. But it is not our sacred institutions alone I wish to see reformed; it is the
whole range of civic institution which I desire to see amended but not altered for
the purpose of destruction. 117
Stanley concluded his Knowsley Creed with a suggestion that a national leader and a defender of
the constitution should be willing to pursue necessary and careful reform. 118 His goal in the
Knowsley Creed wasn’t directly to establish a centrist party between the radical Whigs and the
Tories, but rather to suggest that there was room for one. However, with much of his thunder
stolen by Peel’s similar message Stanley’s attempt to organize many of his followers into their
own party became a difficult task.

116

117

118

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

46

When William IV called upon Peel to form a government in December 1834, Peel
immediately approached Stanley and inquired if he would be willing to serve as a member of his
new Conservative ministry. In his reply Stanley stated: “I acknowledge that recent events have
narrowed the ground of difference which heretofore divided us”119 However, despite becoming
closer politically Stanley refused to enter into an alliance with Peel. Stanley’s hesitancy seemed
to center around his concerns that Peel’s Conservative party was just a new form of Toryism.120
In correspondence with one another over Peel’s hundred-day ministry, both Peel and Stanley
agreed how close ideologically they were to one another. Still, Peel’s early attempts to draw in
the Dillyite forces were met with outright rejection. In correspondence with Stanley’s right hand
man, Sir James Graham, Peel had requested a union between the factions. Graham, in deference
to Stanley, had politely declined and returned Peels’ offer stating, “in our peculiar position we
think it right to return your packet unopened.”121 Peel’s response to Graham’s decline was that he
hoped the group would eventually reconsider.122Peel’s first attempt to draw in these potential
‘conservative’ forces was premature. His Tamworth Conservativism was still too new while his
support from the Tories aroused suspicions that Peel’s Conservative Party was simply a renamed
Tory party. However, as Peel’s first government neared its end Stanley and his supporters
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became more open towards Peel’s Conservativism and saw it less as a version of Toryism and
certainly preferable to the radicalism of the Whigs.123
Peel’s later attempts to bring the Derby Dilly into the Conservative fold would often
suggest that an alliance between the two, rather than a simple union, might prove beneficial in
the future.124 Stanley’s response to these advances was typically silence. Peel’s later careful
attempts gave the illusion that the Dillityes would maintain independence in an alliance rather
than be suborned in a union. However, both Stanly and Peel realized that the continuation of a
third party was not a long-term option and a union, with either the Whigs or the Conservatives,
was seemingly inevitable. The results of the 1835 election drove this home, as they were
particularly bad news for Stanley’s Derby Dilly party. The success of the Conservative party in
early 1835 meant that Stanley’s long-term plan to form an independent party was going to be
difficult to realize.
By the spring of 1835, Stanley’s supporters began to shift towards an alliance with Peel
after John Russell’s Whigs formalized their union with O’Connell and the Irish radicals.125 This
union pushed Stanley and his supporters further away from a return to the Whigs and closer
towards Peel and his Conservatives. In correspondence with the Duke of Wellington Sir Henry
Hardinge indicated that he believed that Graham and, most importantly, Stanley were beginning
to shift towards an alliance with Peel’s Party. When referring to his conversation with Graham,
Hardinge stated, “His conversation was very Conservative, with a conviction that the difficulties

123

Lord Stanley to Robert Peel March 29, 1835. Robert Peel From his Private Papers Vol. II. ed. Charles Stuart
Parker 298.
124

Ibid., 298.

125

Ibid., 298.

48

of the Melbourne Government were so great that it can hardly outlive the session.”126
Wellington’s response suggested that the coming alliance (not quite a union) with Stanley’s
Derby Dilly could prove beneficial for Peel’s party, particularly in upcoming elections.
Wellington believed that the relative similarities between the two groups was growing stronger
and that “ my own conviction is that we are looking to the same objects, and feel much more
interested in protecting the monarch, and the public interests involved in its security.”127
Continued independence of the Dillyites gradually declined after Peel’s hundred days in
office. The cheers that echoed around the House for Peel as he left office signaled the coming
end to Stanley as an independent figure outside of the two parties. Lord Melbourne’s new
government could hardly count on the Dillyites for support after Russell’s strategic union with
O’Connell. To the Dillyites a return to Whig party became a less realistic option with every
passing day. Stanley acknowledged that his hopes of an independent third party were coming to
an end. In his own words, Stanley noted, “The formation of ‘the Dilly’ depended upon the
balance of parties being such that a section comparatively triflingly in numbers, could exercise a
powerful influence over a weak government… But no calculations can lead us to flatter
ourselves that one can exercise any such influence now.”128
The end of the Derby Dilly was not a simple merger with the Conservative party and the
resistance from some of Stanley’s supporters lasted well after Stanley himself had suggested a
union with Peel’s Conservative party. The Duke of Richmond in numerous letters to Stanley
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suggested that it would be highly unlikely he would seek office again even if Peel were to defeat
Melbourne’s government.129 The most peculiar support of Lord Stanley came in the form of a
letter submitted to The Times on February 6th 1836. In the letter, Stanley was labeled a viable
candidate for a future Prime Ministership, as well as a brilliant current political leader. The
author praised many of Stanley’s actions since 1834 (especially his refusal to join Peel) as
“honourable, and in defence of the prosperity of the nation rather than to gratify his own
ambition.”130 Signed simply ‘Runnymede’ the author was in reality the debt-ridden novelist and
future Conservative MP Benjamin Disraeli.
Stanley’s move to the Conservative benches was met with resistance from his own
members and a final division of the Dillyites between the Whigs and Conservatives. The
division of the Dillyites by the end of December 1837 was finalized and despite Stanley’s union
with Peel many of his Dillyites returned to the Whig party. The leading members of the Dillyite
party who joined Peel were Lord George Bentinck, James Graham, the Duke of Richmond and
Lord Ripon. Others returned to Whig party under John Russell, but with clear-cut reservations
about the alliance with Irish radicals. 131 With Stanley’s party dissolved Peel acted quickly to
welcome the Derby faction into his Conservative party. This was exactly what Peel had hoped
for in his Tamworth Manifesto, the inclusion of moderates into the fold. Stanley’s conversion to
Conservativism was gradual and his similarities with Peel, concerning his ideas of selective
reform, and the necessity to reform for the national good were welcomed. However, many of the
Dillyites still did not trust Peel and Graham in particular often called out Peel’s shortcomings.
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Knowing that Graham was Stanley’s right hand man Peel knew that Graham’s concerns were
also Stanley’s. Therefore when Peel listened to Graham and acted accordingly he was thereby
attempting to win over Stanley.132 An example of this was when Peel drafted a bill to reform
Irish municipal corporations to localize control. Both Stanley and Graham had supported the
localization of Irish municipalities. Their support of improving government in Ireland through an
Irish Municipal Reform Act (municipal reform had passed in England and Wales in 1835)
illustrated their commitment to a particular form of Conservatism. Although this Bill was
defeated Peel gained the formal support of Stanley and the Dillyites for a union by the end of the
year.133 Peel’s adjustment of Conservative policy to secure Stanley’s long-term support
illustrated his commitment to necessary reform (even to his own ideas) to maintain stability and
success within his party.
Peel’s acquisition of the Dillyites to the Conservative cause set the precedent for his
national objective of a future Conservative government. In the years immediately after the party
was formed it achieved massive gains in the elections of 1835 and 1837. Earning close to one
hundred new seats in 1835 the Conservatives greatly reduced the gap between them and the
Whigs. Table 1 illustrates the Conservative seats gained in the elections since 1832. It is to be
noted that while the Party was officially labeled Conservative in 1834 the 1832 results apply to
the Tories.
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England 471
Scotland 53
Wales 29
Ireland 105
Total 658

Conservative Election results 1832-1841
1832
1835
1837

1841

129
10
13
33
175

283
22
19
43
367

209
15
17
38
273

244
20
18
32
314

Table 1 Conservatives returned in elections between Peel governments134
Peel’s success in 1837 came partially from the acquisition of ex-Whigs but was also the result of
the national respect he began to receive as a leader.
Offering a dramatic turnaround from the Tories’ disastrous defeat in 1832 Peel’s
Tamworth Conservativism had indeed worked. However, Peel noted that the party still remained
fragile. The Ultra Tories only tolerated Peel’s leadership and the Dillyites did not fully trust
Peel, but certainly approved of him over Russell and O’Connell. Peel’s challenge during the
remainder of the 1830s was to bring together the various types of ‘conservatives’ and unify them
under the mantle of his Tamworth Conservativism. As he stated 1837,
Few people can judge the difficulty there has frequently been of maintaining
harmony between the various branches of the Conservative Party — the great
majority in the House of Lords and the minority in the House of Commons
consisting of very different elements that had been in open conflict within a recent
period.135
Peel’s new Conservative party in the 1830s was the union of Ultra Tories, ‘liberal’ Tories and
ex-Whigs. These three different groups together under one Conservative umbrella was a very
difficult group for Peel to manage. To unify these three Peel had to make his brand of
Conservativism the most appealing option. His attempts to do this consisted of appeasing the
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Ultra Tories through the appointment of the Ultra Sir Edward Knatchball to his 1834 ministry
and cementing his alliance with Stanley by taking the side of the Derby Dilly and pursuing Irish
municipal reform. Peel’s calculated moves during his leadership of the new Conservative party
earned him allies from the right and the left. However, a definition of Conservativism was still a
huge question. What was it that made Conservativism different from Toryism, ‘liberal’ Toryism,
or even Whiggism? These questions plagued both Stanley’s Dillyites and the Ultra Tories.
For Peel’s Ultra Tory critics his Conservativism and its’ so called development were
dubious. The Duke of Newcastle stated that ‘the only difference between Sir Robert Peel and
Lord John Russell is that one would only give a handful where the other would give
bushels’.136Newcastle’s Ultra Tory perspective argued that the ‘liberal’ Tory Peel and the Whig
John Russell were very similar with only minor differences. In his 1844 political novel,
Coningsby or the New Generation Benjamin Disraeli critiqued Peel’s actions during the 1830s
and particularly the way he had formed his Conservative party. While Disraeli wrote Coningsby
a decade after the events of 1834, given his role in later internal party struggles, his criticism of
Peel’s Conservative party nonetheless remains important for historical analysis. Disraeli had
argued that Peel’s Conservativism had been a vain attempt to reform Toryism with ‘liberal’
Whig values.137 In his novel, the discussion between the characters Tadpole and Taper illustrated
a particular criticism of Peel’s Conservative party. Disraeli’s characters suggested that Peel’s
party was abandoning Tory values in favor of popular Whig measures:
‘True, terribly true,' said Mr. Taper. 'That we should ever live to see a Tory
government again! We have reason to be very thankful.'
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'Hush!' said Mr. Tadpole. 'The time has gone by for Tory governments; what the
country requires is a sound Conservative government.'
'A sound Conservative government,' said Taper, musingly. 'I understand: Tory
men and Whig measures.'138
Critiques like those found in Coningsby were not far from the truth. Between 1834 and
1841many Tories suggested that Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism was abandoning Tory
principles simply to curry favor with the new electorate. While many of Peel’s followers had
attached themselves to this smart political strategy, others felt the abandonment of principles was
damaging to the future of a Conservative party. Disraeli like other Conservatives, (Stanley
included) had asked the natural question ‘if Conservative principles are about preservation and
conservation how will that be achieved through the act of reform?’139
Peel tackled this criticism frequently and suggested that reform was an active way to
preserve state institutions. Often his Conservative party was suggested to be ‘a party without
principles’ or a group of ‘Tory men with Whig values’. Peel responded to his critics that his
Conservativism had its own principles that separated it from the old Tory party. In defense of his
Conservative idea, Peel argued that his party had a firm set of principles that were grounded in
Toryism but were Conservative in their own way:
By conservative principles I mean, a maintenance of the settled institutions of
church and state, and I mean also the maintenance, defence, and continuation of
those laws, those institutions, that society, and those habits and manners which
have contributed to mould and form the character of Englishmen140
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Peel’s argument with party critics suggested that what he saw as Conservativism was different
from Toryism. ‘Maintenance of settled institutions of church and state’ meant that reform was
necessary to preserve them and guide them into the future.141 Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism
was not about the continuation of the Status Quo ante; instead it called for a transformation and
modernization of Tory social values. Despite Peel’s argument for Conservatism and his electoral
success many members of his party still harbored serious suspicions of the man and his
‘principles’.
***
According to Gash’s interpretation, the formation of Peel’s Conservative party in the
mid-1830s suggested that Peel had reformed Toryism through the Tamworth Manifesto into a
pragmatic centrist party. The inclusion of Lord Stanley into the fold was the primary evidence of
this pragmatism by Peel. Conversely, Hilton had argued that Peel’s inclusion of ex-Whigs was
designed to help support his ‘liberal’ Tory doctrine and alienate the Ultras, furthering his
‘Conservativism’ as the defining ideology of his new party. Hilton argues that Peel’s inclusion
of Stanley and the Dillyites was necessary to further these ‘liberal’ ideological doctrines.
However, while these authors argue that Peel acted either as a liberal wolf in sheep’s clothing or
was simply a political pragmatist, this study maintains that the Conservativism Peel professed
emerged more as a synthesis of old Whig policies (after being passed through the filter of Peel’s
‘liberal’ Toryism) and Tory the social values that Peel believed his party was to defend.
The significance of Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto and its transformation of the Tory party
cannot be underestimated. Between his first and second Ministries, Peel had successfully
reversed the Tories electoral defeat of 1832, and revived and transformed Toryism into a
successful post-Reform Bill political party. Attaining high office for Peel during the 1830s was
141
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about maintaining and securing a sense of stability after the Tory collapse in 1832. Peel’s
Tamworth Manifesto outlined not only the objectives of his first ministry but of his new, more
broadly-based Conservative movement. The addition of ex-Whigs into the Conservative party
brought about what Peel had aimed for in designing a post-Reform Bill party. Peel politics
starting in 1830 have been observed as both pragmatic and partial to the ‘liberal’ Tory political
doctrine. His consistencies with the ‘liberal’ Tory movement a decade earlier illustrate that his
Tamworth Conservativism was the logical evolution of these ideas. Conservativism’s dual
principles – the necessity of reform for the national interest (as defined by Peel) and the
maintenance of state institutions through careful reform– were the basis of his Tamworth
Conservativism.
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CHAPTER III
TAMWORTH CONSERVATIVISM FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY: THE SECOND
PEEL MINISTRY AND THE CORN LAW CRISIS
The 1841 election resulted in a Conservative government and a personal victory for Peel.
Securing a Conservative majority in the Commons vindicated his Conservative idea and, in his
mind, illustrated that the Tories were being transformed into a new party.142 After the results of
the general election were finalized Peel stated: “If I exercise power, it shall be upon my
conception - perhaps imperfect, perhaps mistaken, but my sincere conception - of public
duty.”143 Peel’s commitment as Prime Minister from the start of his second ministry was based
upon his sense of public duty. He felt that as the Prime Minister his duty was to the Monarch,
his conscience, and the nation rather than only to the Conservative party.144 Peel’s pursuits of
reforms over the course of his second ministry would receive both praise and criticism. His
Tamworth Conservativism stood for firmness, moderation, and sound judgment to help guide the
institutions of the state (the Church, the aristocracy, and the Monarchy) into the present age.
The fundamental problem at the start of Peel’s second ministry was the party’s lack of a
single unifying ‘conservative’ principle, beyond the maintenance of state institutions through
cautious, well thought-out reform. Peel had suggested in his Tamworth Manifesto (1834) that
142
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every institution of the state was up for careful review. This led to a problem concerning certain
state “institutions,” perhaps most notably those associated with the Corn Laws. Critics had
inquired where reform would stop and to what extent the party was going to pursue reform. If
the Tories refused to accept reform to state institutions, then they were not becoming
Conservatives, rather they were still the obstructionist Tories with a Conservative veneer.
Additionally, some Conservatives worried that reform was simply a type of Whig appeasement.
Peel’s commitments to Tory principles were often doubted. His actions on Catholic
Emancipation in 1829 and his suggestion in 1834 that no institution of the state was safe from
reform stood as examples. Some Conservative party members had intimated that Peel’s
‘conservative’ principles were not very concrete and that maintenance through reform was not a
long-term plan to ‘conserve’ state institutions like the church and the aristocracy. As a result, the
next five years would be challenging ones for Peel, as he worked to keep his conservative forces
unified in the face of several crises.

The Second Peel Ministry Reform and the Corn Laws
The general election of 1841 saw Peel’s party gain 53 seats, pushing its seat total from
314 to 367, thereby providing the Conservatives with a majority government.145 Peel’s return to
the office of Prime Minister was in his mind a confirmation of the success of his Conservative
idea. His electoral triumph brought the first majority for the Conservatives/Tories since the
passage of the Reform Bill nine years earlier. However, the Conservative triumph of 1841 was
slowly undercut by the growing problems associated with the Corn Laws. Pressure from the
newly formed Anti-Corn Law League (1838) had forced Peel and his Conservative party to deal
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with the Corn Law issue in the general election. The problem of the Corn Laws and
protectionism for Peel in 1841 has been a long debated and heavily politicized topic. Some
historians have argued that Peel had converted to free trade well before 1841. 146 Other scholars
have suggested that by 1841 Peel experienced his first serious doubts concerning the
protectionist doctrine. 147 Whatever Peel’s true position on protection in 1841, it remains
important to note that his earlier mentions of protectionism indicated that reform must be
pursued to maintain the security of the state. Although protectionism was not explicitly
mentioned, the concluding remarks of the Tamworth Manifesto stated his position on the
economy arguing for, “the impartial consideration of what is due to all interests’ agricultural,
manufacturing, and commercial.”148 Peel’s argument for a careful and impartial consideration of
all interests when approaching reform defined his Conservatism not as pragmatic but as cautious.
The principles concerning protectionism which Peel argued for in 1834, had not dramatically
changed by 1841. His party’s commitment to the maintenance of protectionism would result in a
Conservative triumph. While historians often overlook the election of 1841 (in favor of larger
events such as Corn Law repeal in 1846), it remains critical in a study of Peel’s rise and fall over
the course of his second ministry.
The Conservative candidates that stood for election in 1841, as many historians have
noted, did so on the platform of protection. Lord Ashburton wrote to Peel after the general
election stating, “I am aware to what extent our Conservative party is a party pledged to the

146

Hilton, ‘Peel: A Reappraisal,’ 2

147

Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation 1830-1850
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. 1953), 287.
148

Peel, "Tamworth Manifesto," 2.

59

support of the land, and that that principle abandoned the party is dissolved”149 In effect, he
argued that maintenance of the Corn Laws in 1841 was an essential component of the
Conservative platform and ideology. However, maintenance of the Corn Laws, to many
Conservatives, was not just a matter of continuing them in their current state. Conservatives in
1841 would argue for reforms to improve the efficacy of the laws. Modifications to the sliding
scale were the type of reforms that Conservatives believed would alleviate the problems with the
Corn Laws.150 The sliding scale had been designed in 1828 to adjust to the rise and fall of the
price of grain. The Wellington government (in which Peel acted as Home Secretary) had
introduced the concept of the sliding scale to allow foreign grain duty free importation when the
domestic price had reached 72s per quarter. The scale was supposed to provide relief to the poor
by potentially lowering the price of bread but, by 1841, it was having the opposite effect –
keeping grain and therefore bread artificially high. 151 Calls to modify the sliding scale yet again
actually came first from Conservative agriculturalists. They argued a modification was necessary
to provide relief to the farmers who found it difficult to sell grain at artificially high prices.
However, the call from the agriculturalists to modify the Corn Laws was not singular.
Pressure from the working classes to lower the price of bread was most clearly articulated
by the Chartists. 152 To the Conservatives the Chartist movement, a working class political group,
had been a thorn in their side since its inception. While pressures from the Chartists most
certainly influenced the election, the overall electoral importance of the working classes was
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minimal because of restrictions to the franchise. The group that did have a large presence in the
election was the Anti-Corn Law League. The ACLL’s attacks on what it coined the “Bread Tax”
became a powerful weapon against the Corn Laws and their continued maintenance.153 An earlier
attempt by the Whig government, in 1839, to open an inquiry into the Corn Laws had failed to
gather sufficient support from the Whig backbenches. While the attempt in 1839 failed to gather
parliamentary support, it provided considerable impetus for the idea of national extraparliamentary agitation against the continuation of the Laws by the ACLL.154 One of the
League’s most prominent spokesmen within the House was the Whig MP Charles Pelham
Villiers. He would, from 1838 until 1845, continually attempt to introduce a Bill to repeal the
Corn Laws in their entirety. His yearly attempts would fail to gather support from his own party,
despite the praise he received from free trade groups like the ACLL. Still, Villiers and other
ACLL members of Parliament became problematic for Peel and the Conservative party. Cries of
“cheap bread” and “Free trade” became contentious slogans that Peel and his Conservative
government had to face. Demands to address the Corn Laws from both the Laws’ supporters and
opponents became a crucial item Peel had to address in the early days of his second ministry.
Peel himself had carefully avoided the issue of the Corn Laws in the election of 1841. As The
Illustrated London News would later put it, “He left himself many loopholes of escape from the
charge of intentional tergiversation.”155 Peel’s delay over taking a personal position on the Corn
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Law issue until after the election secured the much-needed support of the whole of the
Conservative party.
Thus as one of the most important subjects of the election of 1841, the Corn Laws
became an immediate issue for Peel and his new ministry to address. Peel’s post-election
discussion of the Corn Laws suggests that his intentions to reform the Corn Laws (not repeal
them) had been part of his Conservative character since carefully dodging the issue in the
election of 1841. In a discussion before the new parliament, Peel stated that a reform of the
sliding scale was necessary and a continuation of the Laws in their present form problematic. As
he put it in the House,
I will not bind myself to the details of the existing law, but will reserve to myself
the unfettered discretion of considering and amending that law. I hold the same
language now; but if you ask me whether I bind myself to the maintenance of the
existing law in its details, or if you say that that is the condition on which the
agricultural interest give me their support, I say that on that condition I will not
accept their support.156
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism is evident in this early discussion of the Corn Laws. To Peel
the Corn Laws were not a sine qua non of Conservativism; they could be modified or repealed
entirely if that was in the best interest of the nation. His 1841 speech over the possibility of
reforming the sliding scale took nothing off the table. Peel advised his party and the nation that
if the Corn Laws were not functioning as they were intended, reform or even repeal might be
necessary. As he explained it in the summer of 1841,
I would earnestly advise a relaxation, an alteration, nay, if necessary, a repeal of
the Corn-laws. But it is because I cannot convince my mind that the Corn-laws
are at the bottom of this distress, or that the repeal of them, or the alteration of
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their principle, would be its cure, that I am induced to continue my maintenance
of them157
The suggestion that Peel made in this early Corn Law debate illustrated that he clearly saw
himself as Prime Minister to a nation rather than Prime Minister to a Conservative government.
The suggestion of total repeal in 1841, while overly alarming to the Tories, addressed his form of
Conservativism as one that sought for the good of the nation through necessary reform. He had
to satisfy those that helped him into power but also those whom he believed would see his party
into the future. Any suggestion of a total repeal, in 1841, was risky and yet Peel left all options
open.
Suggestions from members of the Whig opposition to change or modify the Corn Laws
had sparked outrage within Peel’s Conservative party. The MP William Mure retroactively saw
Peel’s 1841 suggestion of a possible modification of the Corn Laws or even repeal as a sign that
Peel had always intended to repeal them in their entirety. 158 His suggestion that if repeal should
become necessary he would pursue it, became a point of tension with his own party. Peel
therefore had to use caution when it came to proposing alterations to the Corn Laws.159 To the
Tories that had helped him win the election only modification to the Corn Laws was acceptable,
as it was what they had campaigned on, as opposed to the option of repeal. The election of 1841
had been, after all, about modification, not repeal. However, some in Parliament argued that
slight modifications to the existing Corn Laws were not a permanent solution to the problems
they were causing in 1841. As Viscount Palmerston argued in a debate in late autumn of 1841,
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[It’s] the obligation on the part of the Government to prove and to declare to
Parliament their determination on that great question— the Corn-laws, and on our
whole commercial policy. He [Peel] would entreat them to consider this,
persuaded as he was that the public would never be contented with the proposition
to Parliament of some petty change in the "pivot," or some slight alteration of the
"sliding scale;" and that even supposing the existing distress to subside, the
country would not be satisfied with any measure short of one which would
substantially, bonâ fide, permit the introduction of foreign corn at a moderate
fixed duty.160
Peel’s response to Palmerston was that his objective and that of his colleagues, was to maintain
the institution of the Corn Laws and reform them to work.161 Many of the members of his
government, who had helped him win office, were from rural constituencies, and wholeheartedly
believed in the continuation of the Corn Law.162 Therefore Peel had to maintain a careful
approach when it came to modifying the Corn Laws, since a large portion of his party had
declared them a crucial institution of the state. His response upon being prodded a second time
within a few months of taking office was to abstain from any further comments. Peel had
understood that if the Corn Laws were to be modified both reform and the approach to reform
had to be careful. 163 If he was to maintain his position as Prime Minister as well as the stability
of the nation he and his party would have to act carefully when it came to review of the Corn
Laws.
Peel’s eventual response was to propose a slight modification to the sliding scale. The
changes to the Corn Laws in 1842 lowered the duty threshold for the free importation of grain
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from the previous level of 72s per quarter to 51s per quarter. These adjustments were designed
to help lower the overall price of grain. The new duty-free threshold of 51s per quarter had the
desired effect as there was an almost immediate drop in the price of domestic grain. By the same
token, in modifying the Corn Laws, Peel was actively maintaining the institution of
protectionism. As his Tamworth Conservativism suggested, Peel was working within an existing
system to make it work more efficiently rather than changing it fundamentally. This modification
was, in his mind, preferable and more palatable to Parliament and his Conservatives than general
repeal.164 Some historians have argued that by 1841 Peel’s modifications to the Corn Laws were
actually steps towards free trade. However, Peel’s modifications to the Corn Laws were strongly
supported by the Protectionists who had campaigned on reform to the Corn Laws in the previous
election.165 If it was true that Peel was slowly dismantling the Corn Laws in 1842, then it was
also the case that he had the support of the Protectionists in this endeavor. This theory that Peel
was slowly dismantling the Corn Laws starting in 1842 doesn’t seem to have much validity.
Peel’s motivation in 1842, like that of the Protectionists, was to reform the system to make it
work more efficiently rather than to change it fundamentally.
Additional modifications by Peel in 1843 opened Britain to the importation of Canadian
corn at preferential rates. The expansion of the Canadian Corn Act was designed in part to
provide relief to farmers in Upper Canada by granting a guaranteed market for Canadian grain
growers.166 The passage of this Act in 1843 allowed Canadian grain to enter the British market at
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a nominal duty and all flour manufactured in Canada at a proportionate rate. The Colonial
secretary, Lord Stanley, who advocated for the Canadian Corn Bill, was met around the House
with cheers when he observed that, “It is because the measure is purely a colonial measure, that
as the Colonial Minister of the day, I now ask the House to grant Canada a boon… to which they
have solicited for at least five and twenty years.”167 Stanley’s speech suggested that this
expansion of the British market to include Canada was not a question of free trade or a critique
of the Corn Laws but an expansion of national interests in colonial affairs.168 Additionally the
Protectionists supported the Corn Bill of Canada as a way to secure closer ties within the empire.
The expansion of the Corn Laws, to include Canadian grain at preferential rates, was both an
attempt to strengthen ties within the empire and to help alleviate the higher price of domestic
grain by reducing shipments from the American market.169 Conservative opposition to the Bill
was minimal. The few Conservative opponents argued that American grain could pass into
Canada and enter into Britain to avoid the higher importation duty.170 To these select few
Protectionists the Canadian Corn Bill, as they saw it, was a slow transition towards a free trade
system, rather than what Stanley called a boon to the famers of Canada. However, most
Conservatives accepted it because it was far from an abandonment of protection but rather an
expansion of protectionism into the empire.171
The Corn Law policy of 1842 and the Canadian Corn Bill of 1843 illustrated Peel’s
Tamworth Conservativism in action. In 1841, both he and protectionist Tories acknowledged
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that an adjustment to the sliding scale was necessary.172 These reforms to an existing state
institution followed Peel’s simple, but not simplistic, notion of Tamworth Conservativism, that is
to say they were to preserve and guide the Corn Laws forward in the interests of Britain and the
empire rather than simply repeal them. The Protectionist William Mure would argue in his 1847
book The Commercial Policy of Pitt and Peel 1785-1846, that Peel’s modifications to the Corn
Laws in 1842-43 were what Tory Protectionists had always feared, a move towards free trade.173
However, these claims over Peel’s belief in free trade have been hotly contested. It is impossible
to know if the modifications to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 were in fact designed to lead the nation
towards free trade or were simply necessary reforms for national and imperial interest. While
suspicions of Peel’s conversion to free trade have proliferated through the historiography, given
the lack of any positive proof in Peel ‘s own words, it makes more sense to view the pursuit of
necessary reforms by Peel as a logical extension of his Tamworth Conservativism.
The rise of ACLL and Chartist agitation created a problem for Peel’s administration. For
Peel the League, more so than the Chartists, was problematic, as members of the House clearly
were being influenced by League propaganda. Lead by two great orators Richard Cobden (MP
for Stockport since 1841) and John Bright (MP City of Durham) the League argued that the Corn
Laws had outlived their usefulness and that free trade should become the national policy. With a
foothold in the House and a successful national fundraising campaign the League applied
significant pressure on the Peel government to repeal the Corn Laws. Peel and the Conservatives
had responded to these pressures with the modifications of the Corn Laws in 1842-3. Peel’s 1842
modifications to the Corn Laws had slowed the League’s momentum and earned him more
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middle class support, which the League had needed.174 Peel’s reforms to the Corn Laws arguably
worked against League propaganda by illustrating that protectionism could work and that the
Corn Laws had not outlived their usefulness.
Additionally the Plug Plots of 1842 became a concern to the Peel government as it
reacted to League agitation. The Plug Plot Riots were alleged to be the result of a reduction of
wages implemented by Anti-Corn Law manufacturers.175 As part of the larger General Strike of
1842 the Plug Plot Riots started in the industrial centers of Britain and then became a national
crisis. Many workers took direct action by pulling out the plugs in the mill equipment to stop
work altogether. Most historians have argeed that the Plug Plots and the general strike of 1842
were fueled by Chartist demands and the abysmal economic conditions of the working classes. A
reduction of wages by the manufacturers, terrible living conditions, long working hours and little
to no representation drove many of the working classes to riot.176 However, many Conservatives
saw something else at work: an ACLL conspiracy to foment popular discontent in order to force
the government’s hand on Corn Law repeal. Graham, in a letter to Peel, argued that the
manufacturers who supported the Anti-Corn Law League had intentionally pushed the working
classes to their current level of desperation, through a reduction of wages, in order to force the
government to consider repealing the Corn Laws.177 This theory has been difficult for historians
to investigate. Although Graham and other members of the Peel government saw a clear cut
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connection between the League and the riots, most historians believe more was at work than
ACLL manufacturers manipulating the working classes. Indeed, most historians argue that the
strikers were not as concerned with the Corn Laws as Graham had believed, but rather sought a
restoration of wages and more importantly the acceptance of the People’s Charter.178 Although
Peel remained hesitant to send in the army against the strikers (perhaps to avoid another
Peterloo) he eventually agreed with Wellington and called in the army to break up the strike.179
After the general strike was ended, an investigation by the government could not determine
beyond reasonable doubt that the League had had a hand in promoting the strikes or was
connected to the general reduction of wages across the region. Peel, and to a greater extent,
Graham were extremely dissatisfied with the local magistrates, and believed many of them
(being ACLL members) were protecting those behind the agitation.180
While the government’s official report stated that the riots were caused by Chartist
agitation, both Peel and Graham believed that was false. Certain as they were that the true cause
of the riots was Anti-Corn Law League influence, both Graham and Peel demanded a more
thorough investigation into the causes of the riots and the alleged links to the ACLL. 181 Peel
argued that the local officials had protected those at fault and that ties to the League proliferated
in the area.182
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Those who believed Graham’s claim that the League was behind the riots, particularly the
Protectionist Conservatives, became fearful about just how far the League was willing to go to
force the government to repeal the Corn Laws. The Protectionist wing of the party argued that
an alliance between the working classes and the landlords against the factory owners would be
an effective force to challenge the ACLL. As a result, the growing strength of the League was
countered early in 1843 by the emergence of a series of agricultural protection societies, most
notably the Central Agricultural Protection Society (CAPS) under the leadership of the Duke of
Richmond and the Duke of Buckingham. Lead primarily by Richmond CAPS was a supposedly
non-partisan organization dedicated to pressuring MP’s for the continuation of protection. Much
like the ACLL this Anti-League organization worked as an external pressure group to convince
the government – and the nation–that protection should be maintained. While CAPS has been
characterized by some historians as an organization of aristocratic landlords and economic
ignoramuses who were out of touch with the latest developments in economic thought, the CAPS
was far more sophisticated than this. The Protectionist members of the CAPS were actually well
versed in the works of Adam Smith. In fact, in the organization’s charter, Adam Smith’s defense
of the necessity of Corn Laws to maintain the price of grain was one of the cornerstones in its
defense of protection.183 Additionally, the CAPS challenged League propaganda that the Corn
Laws were only continued because they supported the high rents of the Landlords.184 The
society refuted these accusations by noting that many working class laborers and independent
farmers relied on protectionism to maintain their wages. They also argued that the calls for free
trade benefited only the manufacturing interests. Protectionists maintained, with some justice,
183

Edward Stillingfleet Cayley Esq., MP. Reasons for the Formation of the Agricultural protection society
Addressed to the Industrious Classes of the United Kingdom. (London: John Ollivier, 59, Pall Mall 1844), 6.
184

Ibid., 22.

70

that while the manufacturing class did not have much in the way of international competition
there was scarcely a country of Europe/North America that did not have some type of Corn
Laws.185 CAPS concluded its argument about protectionism stating that a relaxation of
protection might make goods cheap but asked did that cheapness have to be at the expense of the
working classes?
The Conservative party’s protection of working class interests, particularly after the Plug
Plot Riots, became another key element of reform for Peel’s second government. The 1844
Factory Act was designed to limit the working hours of children to nine hours and of women to
no more than twelve.
In a proposed amendment to the Factory Act Sir James Graham introduced a section
aimed at further reducing the working hours of adolescents. Afterwards Lord Ashely had
suggested replacing the words “twelve” with “Ten”.186 This aim at reducing the working hours
for youths was the first serious attempt at instituting a ten hour workday. Lord Ashely had
received support from a large number of Conservatives and their rationale for support was split
between humanitarian relief and Anti-League feelings. However, the amendment was defeated
by seven votes and in a letter to the Queen, a frustrated Peel explained exactly how this issue had
divided his party,
A great body of the agricultural members, partly out of hostility to the Anti-Corn
Law League, partly from the influence of humane feelings, not foreseeing the
certain consequences as to the Corn Laws of new restrictions upon labour, voted
against the government. It is difficult to foresee what may be the result of this
question. Your Majesty's servants are in a minority, but they consider it would be
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inconsistent with their public duty to sanction or acquiesce in the views of the
majority. There may be a different result of the division on Friday next.187
Those who voted against Peel in this amendment to the Factory Act were in favor of a shortened
workday, both to attack the source of the ACLL and out of human concern. Despite Lord
Ashely’s attempt to reduce the working hours from twelve to ten hours with his amendment, the
Factory Act did indeed pass with full support from the Peel government. This division of the
Conservative party over an amendment to a reform remains an interesting example of landed
Tories pushing for more reform than Peel had envisioned. Peel and his government may have
defeated the amendment to introduce a ten hour day but Peel’s reasoning behind his votes
appears to be in line with his brand of Conservativism, that is to say Peel did not pursue the
additional reform because it was not necessary at the moment. Peel had argued that the previous
reform of twelve hours had been the furthest reform that could be accepted by the factory owners
and the government. As he put it, “we have arrived at the utmost limit to which we can agree to
limit the labour of adults”.188 In addition, Peel had recognized that a number of his fellow
Conservatives had voted for Lord Ashley’s amendment solely because of their hostility to the
ACLL and their friends and allies, the manufacturers. The Russian ambassador, Baron Bunow,
was present at the debate when the House rejected Lord Ashley’s amendment and his comments
on Peel’s speech noted that; “It was impossible to speak with more reason, moderation, and
strength.” 189 Peel’s address over the connection between the Corn Laws, and the regulation of
factories earned him a round of applause. Even after his failure to support a ten-hour day Lord
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Ashely thanked Peel for his honesty and moderation when voting against the amendment. The
limited regulation of factories appears as a successful application of Tamworth Conservativism
in Peel’s administration in which some Conservatives sought to achieve reform beyond what
Peel himself had determined was necessary.190
To Peel the passage of the Factory Act proved that his party would willingly pursue
reforms that it believed to be for the good of the nation. However, a number of his Conservative
colleagues sought to go further and only voted on Lord Ashley’s ten hour amendment as a way
to attack the ACLL.191 These traditional Tory members of the party would become a problem
when pursuing other reforms that Peel deemed necessary for the good of the nation, and perhaps
not coincidentally, for the good of Conservativism. The issue that would be the most damaging
to Peel’s party (until his decision to repeal the Corn Laws) was the Maynooth Grant.
Peel’s objective with the Maynooth Grant was to improve relations between Protestant
England and Catholic Ireland by increasing the annual grant from the government to the Catholic
seminary in Maynooth, Ireland. Expanding Catholic influence in Ireland rather than protecting
the Protestant church of Ireland infuriated many Tories within the Conservative party. Anti-Irish
and anti-Catholic sentiment flared up across the nation in response to Peel’s proposal to increase
the grant. While it was often observed that the Church of England was the Tory party at prayer,
this was no laughing matter for the Tories. The Royal College of St. Patrick at Maynooth was a
Catholic seminary and since the Union of 1801 its grant had been controlled by London. Peel’s
Maynooth Bill proposed to raise the grant from its previous sum of under £10,000 to roughly
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£30,000. Moreover, the grant was to become permanent.192 Many Tories found it doubly
insulting that it was Peel, who had helped to pass Catholic emancipation in 1829, who was
behind this pro-Catholic reform. What Peel had sought in the Maynooth Grant was an easing of
the hostilities between Irish Catholics and the English Protestant church.193 Peel’s notion of
necessary reform led him to believe that relaxing tensions in Ireland was essential – for the good
of the Union– and that increasing the Maynooth Grant was a relatively low cost reform that
could serve the larger interests of the nation. Others argued it was dangerous for a Protestant
state to support a Catholic seminary, leading to fierce national debates over the future of
Maynooth. Queen Victoria wrote about this political problem that had divided her government
and was in shock at the ferocity of the opposition to Peel’s proposal: “I am sure poor Peel ought
to be blessed by all Catholics for the manly and noble way in which he stands forth to protect
and do good to poor Ireland. RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY! But bigotry, wicked and blind passions it
brings forth is quite dreadful, and I blush for Protestantism!194 The Queen’s reaction to the
criticism that Peel received during the Maynooth controversy suggested that opposition on the
grant was both a national problem in matters related to religion and an internal Conservative
Party problem in relation to the extent of reform that could be tolerated by certain members of
the party. This controversy among Conservatives was caricatured in the satirical magazine
Punch. Situated between supporters and opponents, within his own party, Peel was compared to
heroes in a Greek Tragedy. The cartoon, titled The Position of The Premier, shows Peel in the
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center, and flanked on either side by members of his own party, in both praise and disgust
(Figure 1).195 Those on the left side of Peel (Wellington) have their hands raised and look up at
the Prime Minister. While those on the right (Disraeli) have their heads turned away, revolted by
Peel’s expansion of the Maynooth Grant and his support of a Catholic institution.

Figure 1. The Position of the Premier
The cartoon illustrated the internal problems Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism was having by
1845. While many leading members of the party saw Peel as praiseworthy, the Tories
increasingly saw him as an apostate of Tory social values. Peel’s own beliefs on the expansion of
Maynnoth College were simple: for the long-term security of Protestant rule over Ireland
concessions had to be made, an opinion he shared with many of his supporters despite Tory and
public outcries. Still, no matter how carefully reasoned, the Maynooth Grant, like Peel’s
acceptance of Catholic emancipation in 1829, made many Tories suspicious of his Conservative
ideology.
The public and press were also all too familiar with Peel’s changes of heart on major
issues and had their suspicions even of his dedication to Protestantism. Once again, Peel was
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attacked for his betrayal of Tory values and of the Protestant cause.196 Reactions to Peel’s
changing politics were maliciously satirized in an 1845 edition of Punch:
How wonderful is Peel
He changeth with the Time,
Turning and twisting like an eel
Ascending through the Slime.197
Punch’s satire on Peel reflected the intense division over the issue of the Maynooth Grant.
Comparing the Prime Minister to an eel moving through slime was an image many Tories
already had of Peel. Still, despite the anger and feelings of betrayal towards Peel, the Maynooth
Grant was passed. To many, the modifications of the Corn Laws in 1842 and 1843 were also
indicative of Peel’s betrayal of “conservative” ideology. Speeches made by Peel hinted at
modification or repeal of the Corn Laws and confirmed many Tory back-benchers suspicions
that he was willing to betray what they viewed as fundamental conservative principles.198 The
Tories had seen him betray their principles during the debate for Catholic emancipation in 1829
and to them changes to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 were enough evidence to confirm suspicions
that Peel was going to approach Corn Law reform again by the close of 1845.199
The division on the Maynooth grant had been problematic for Peel and internal dissent
over his leadership was becoming more vocal.200 While the Maynooth Grant had passed in the
House of Commons (1845) it drastically weakened Peel’s government and his ability to lead a
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unified Conservative party. The internal Conservative problems after the passage of the
Maynooth Grant began to bring elements of Conservative division into center stage. This
reflected the underlying flaw of Peel’s second ministry, the lack of party unity. Peel had
successfully returned as Prime Minister in 1841 with Tory votes, but his reforms starting with the
expansion of the Maynooth Grant were perceived as an apostasy of Tory social values instead of
necessary reform for the good of the nation.
After the passage of the Maynooth Grant, Peel’s government became more involved with
the Corn Laws. The attacks by the ACLL had increased dramatically since 1841 and debates
over the free-trade nature of Britain were infecting every branch of the political sphere. In
correspondence between Peel and Croker, Peel suggested that coming debates over the Corn
Laws must, at the very least, be centered around the continued maintenance of the nation’s
commercial prosperity.201 While Peel had not yet decided to repeal the Corn Laws in August
1845, he knew that the next time the Corn Laws were up for review, the idea of repeal would be
forced into the debate by the ACLL’s national campaign.202
In October of 1845, with news of the potato blight in Ireland, the ACLL changed its usual
approach and began pressuring the government to repeal the Corn Laws as a form of
humanitarian relief.203 This placed Peel in a difficult position. By autumn 1845 the League had
organized a massive national movement to repeal the Corn Laws and endorse free trade. While
Anti-League organizations had been founded many of those behind these organizations, such as
the CAPS, did little to pressure Peel for a continuation of protectionism out of fear of breaking
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up the party.204 The CAPS organization, unlike the ACLL, had refused to act in elections and
purchase freeholds and by December of 1845 could do little to expand its influence beyond the
already converted. Additionally, with news of the potato famine in Ireland worsening daily, the
League had the perfect political ammunition against any hopes Peel might have had to maintain
the Corn Laws. The famine in Ireland allowed the League to launch a new and popular national
campaign, both for total repeal of the Corn Laws and humanitarian relief in Ireland.205 With the
non-voting public undoubtedly on the side of the League, by late autumn 1845 Peel had to make
a choice; repeal the Corn Laws and alienate many of his own party supporters or face a national
crisis.206 Historians have long debated Peel’s decision to undertake total repeal of the Corn Laws,
but if one considers the key principle of his personal brand of Conservativism, that reforms
which he believed to be absolutely necessary to the preservation of the state must be undertaken
in a proactive fashion, – Peel was actually being quite consistent in his decision to pursue total
repeal of the Corn Laws.
The fight to repeal the Corn Laws starting in late autumn of 1845 placed Peel and the
majority of his party at odds. Peel was now convinced that repeal was a necessary reform and
had to convince his party to pass a total repeal of the Corn Laws. Peel’s ultimate reasoning
behind repeal, rather than a temporary suspension, was that repeal was the necessary reform
required to preserve the other institutions of the state, that is to say the Church and the
aristocracy. Peel’s handling of the Corn Laws through careful reform in 1842-3 had passed his
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party with relative ease and he had believed those reforms had worked.207 However, he knew that
pursuing a total repeal in late 1845 was likely to break his ministry and possibly his party.208 Peel
had a history of changing positions (in his own mind always for the greater good) on reforms that
he deemed to be necessary. Peel’s changing position on the Corn Laws by 1845 was observed
by many Tory backbenchers as nothing more than the result of pressure exerted on the Prime
minister from the ACLL. In the famous carton published by Punch Peel is depicted as a small
child led on a free trade walk by ACLL founder Richard Cobden. 209 This kind of imagery
illustrated to both the public and the Tories that Peel was being led by the ACLL pressures into
repealing the Corn Laws rather than by his own agenda. Tory backbenchers had argued that it
was Peel, not the opposition, who had chipped away at the Corn Laws enough to cause them to
become unenforceable and to force repeal.210 Historians have debated whether or not this
accusation was true. For his part, Peel would later state that repeal at that moment was a
profoundly conservative decision and had been absolutely necessary for the security of the
nation.211
Corn Law Repeal and Conservative Crisis
In any event, by early August of 1845 Peel’s Conservative government had clearly begun
to divide over the issue of the Corn Laws. Peel himself had been ambiguous before on the issue
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of the Corn Laws but pressure to repeal the Corn Laws from the public began to overtake his
commitment to his party’s position. His decision to repeal the Corn Laws, like his earlier
decision to support Catholic emancipation, was a process in the making. Announcing that he
would seek total repeal of the Corn Laws in October of 1845 Peel was subject to a massive
backlash from the Protectionist wing of his own party. Because Parliament was not then in
session – having been in recess since August– Peel remained in power. As Charles Greville
stated before Peel publicly announced his decision on the Corn Laws, the Whigs could not
challenge him and although the Tories despised him they could not publicly oppose him.212
Peel’s official address to Parliament, when that body reconvened in December, calling for a total
repeal of the Corn Laws was met with opposition all around the House.213 Nevertheless, it was
the members of the Conservative party that reacted the most negatively to Peel’s decision to
repeal the Corn Laws.
A few years earlier, the Conservatives had willingly supported his changes to the Corn
Laws and saw those changes as conserving the institution of protectionism. As previously stated,
the Protectionist faction of the Conservative party had already organized a society to counter the
ACLL and to help convince the government to maintain protectionism. The formation of the
CAPS in 1843 to counter the League’s influence over Parliament had also increased the tensions
over the Corn Laws.214 While the Duke of Richmond’s society was supposed to be non-partisan
the bulk of the CAPS membership consisted of Tory Protectionists who did not like the direction
Peel seemed to be taking the party. Peel had remained silent on the issue of protectionism in
212

Charles Greville August 21, 1845. The Greville Memoirs: A Journal of the Reign Queen Victoria from 1837 to
1852 By the Late Charles C.F. Greville Vol. II. ed. Henry Reeve. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1885), 290.
213

Charles Greville December 5, 1845. The Greville Memoirs Vol. II. ed. Henry Reeve 310.

214

Edward Stillingfleet Cayley Esq., MP. Reasons for the Formation of the Agricultural Protection Society
Addressed to the Industrious Classes of the United Kingdom. (London: John Olivier, 59, Pall Mall 1844), 1.

80

1841 and his subsequent modifications to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 had created suspicion. While
he had received Protectionist support for his reforms his announcement to repeal the Corn Laws
was met with overt hostility. Peel’s decision to work towards repeal marked the beginning of a
truly profound Conservative political fragmentation in both Houses of Parliament.215 The
fracturing of the Conservative party over the Corn Laws turned the electoral victory Peel had
achieved in 1841 into a tragedy.
The greatest obstacle in maintaining Peel’s leadership of the Conservative party was the
Tory backbench. These traditional Tory Conservatries were the most vocal opponents of Peel’s
decision to repeal the Corn Laws. Peel’s support for the expansion of the Maynooth Grant had
been a point of tension with the backbenchers, but in their minds his decision to repeal the Corn
Laws was outright treasonous and they could no longer follow him. Protectionist disgust in 1845
began to mount and the divisions between the Protectionists and those remaining loyal to Peel
became more overt. Long pent up anger from the backbenchers directed at Peel, became
problematic for the continued unity of the government. Peel’s Conservative supporters knew a
backbench revolt would be disastrous. As Sir James Graham had foreseen, the Protectionists
were going to be problematic for Conservative unity if repeal of the Corn Laws was going to be
discussed. Months before the potato famine had started Graham had noted, rather presciently
that, “The time will come when this party [Protectionists] will bitterly deplore the fall of Sir
Robert Peel, and when in vain they will wish that they had not overthrown a Government, which
its enemies could not vanquish, but which its supporters abandoned and undermined.”216

215

Charles Greville December 5,1845. The Greville Memoirs Vol. II ed. Henry Reeve 311.

216

Sir James Graham to John Wilson Croker March 22, 1845. Robert Peel From his Private Papers Vol. III. ed.
Charles Stuart Parker 172.

81

With news of the potato blight in Ireland in October of 1845 Robert Peel undertook the
difficult decision to work towards total repeal. Writing to Graham, Peel noticed that the reports
from Ireland indicated that up to a third or even half of the potato crop was lost due to blight.
This to Peel was very alarming.217 Suggestions to suspend the Corn Laws to provide immediate
short-term relief were made but pressure from the ACLL and worries about insurrections in the
North of England made this goal impractical. Historians have often wondered why Peel felt
compelled to pursue total repeal rather than short term suspension. Whatever the ultimate
rationale for his decision, be it as a form of humanitarianism, or more likely a desire to offer
proactive (instead of reactionary) reform designed to prevent a larger crisis in England and
Ireland, by November of 1845 Peel was committed to total repeal. Correspondence with
Wellington, Goulburn and Graham in late October and early-November of 1845 proved that Peel
was determined to affect a total and immediate repeal of the Corn Laws.218 On November 3,
1845, Peel received a letter from Stanley expressing his difference of opinion regarding the
necessity of total repeal of the Corn Laws. Stanley wrote that “I have reflected much and
anxiously upon it; but I cannot bring my mind to any other conclusion.”219 Stanley’s argument
was that the Prime Minister’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws had been undertaken without
careful review and if he were to continue on this path Stanley would oppose him on this measure.
As the battle lines were drawn at the close of the year, Peel began to lose the support of
the majority of his party. In the December 13th, 1845 edition of Punch magazine, a poem titled
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New Sennacherib summed up the situation rather neatly: ”Sir Robert came down so bold, and his
backers felt savage and sorry and sold.”220Peel’s bold decision to repeal the Corn Laws in early
winter had effectively caused a rift in his party. The Protectionists who had pledged their
support to him in 1841 now felt betrayed as Peel decided to pursue total repeal of the Corn Laws.
However, as Peel had argued in 1841 he did not seek the approval of the Protectionists, his
decisions on the Corn Laws or any other necessary reform were tied to his belief that he must act
for the good of the nation. 221 Peel’s decision to seek total repeal sparked vocal opposition from
within his party. Those who spoke out against Peel included Benjamin Disraeli, Lord George
Bentinck, the Duke of Richmond, and Lord Stanley.222 These opponents of Peel’s decision
argued that repeal was both a poor decision and a wrong national policy. Attack from the
Protectionists starting in the winter of 1845 marked the beginning of the decline of Peel’s
leadership of the Conservative party. Indeed, the collapse of Peel’s Conservative government
was now virtually inevitable.
Peel’s insistence on total repeal was ill received by a majority of his party. As a result the
Prime Minister took the unusual step of suggesting that he and his government should resign and
that the opposition should try to form a government. In an interview with the Queen it was
agreed that John Russell should be asked to attempt to form a government.223 Peel wrote to his
wife expressing concern and worry about the future of a Conservative government in the days
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after the meeting.224 He was concerned about the ability of Russell to form a ministry but was
convinced that the actions he had taken in order to work towards repeal of the Corn Laws were
absolutely justified: “Not only have I acted with the best intentions but firmly believe that which
I have done is the best that under the circumstances could have been done.”225 Peel knew that if
Russell were to form a government the Conservative party would split before the Corn Laws
could be successfully repealed. Peel believed that even if Russell could form a (minority)
government Russell could not hope to repeal the Corn Laws alone, that task would still have to
fall on Peel.226 Rumors that Russell had succeeded in forming a minority government on the 18th
of December had Peel on edge.227 However, such rumors were without foundation and Russell
failed to gather support sufficient to form a government. Thus, Peel remained the Prime Minister
and, even with a majority of his party opposed to him he made it irrevocably clear on the 23rd of
December 1845 that upon his return to the House after the Christmas break, he would make it his
objective to repeal the Corn Laws in their entirety.228 His return to the House in January was
marked with the strong division in the Conservative party; his intentions to repeal the Corn Laws
left the majority of the party opposed to his leadership.
Interestingly enough, Peel’s unseating would come not at the hands of the old line Tories
but from a newly developing type of Conservative. Lord George Bentinck, Lord Stanley, and
Benjamin Disraeli would become representatives of the new Conservative Tories. Each of these
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Conservatives had been suspicious of Peel after his stance on the Maynooth Grant and to them
the decision to repeal the Corn Laws was proof of his complete betrayal of Conservative
ideology. Their fundamental opposition to Peel concerned his over extension of reform. By
pressing for a total repeal of the Corn Laws many Protectionist Conservatives thought that, just
as it the case of the Maynooth Grant and Catholic emancipation, Peel was disregarding important
institutions of the state; one of Conservativism’s founding principles. The most vocal of these
Conservative rebels in the spring of 1846 was Benjamin Disraeli.229
An early admirer of Robert Peel’s political genius, Benjamin Disraeli had eventually
become critical of Peel’s Conservative idea as lacking a central doctrine. The young politician
had initially joined Peel as a vocal opponent of the Whigs while his Jewish family background
had been something that had prevented him from aligning with the most reactionary of Tories.230
This had left Disraeli as a unique kind of Tory Conservative.231 While he wanted to be among the
ranks of the elite he often found himself ridiculed because of his Jewish background. Disraeli
began his political career for the constituency of Maidstone in 1837. However, the expenses of
that seat were too much for the debt ridden young Disraeli. By 1841, he secured the
Conservative nomination for Shrewsbury. In addressing a crowd at his new constituency of
Shrewsbury, members of the audience brought bits of pork on a stick and taunted him by
shouting ‘Bring a bit of Pork for the Jew’.232 This kind of ridicule followed Disraeli his entire life
and was not limited to the lower orders of society. Mistrust and taunts because of his Jewish
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background forced the young Disraeli to work much harder to earn respect from his colleagues
and sponsors.
In Disraeli’s attempts to distance himself from his Jewish background he sought
acceptance by the aristocratic class through his writings and dress. Known for his foppish
appearance the young Disraeli would wear a flowery vest and was always concerned with his
appearance. As a novelist, he was often critiqued as an outsider looking into the world of the
aristocracy through a lens that gave him a romanticized view of the country’s most privileged
class.233 It was through these writings that Disraeli attempted to outline the ideology of the
modern Tory or Conservative. 234 His writings would provide one of the most telling critiques of
Peel’s Conservativism and policies since 1834.
Disraeli’s political novels had attempted to identify in words what it meant to be
Conservative and what Conservative principles were supposed to be. An element he often
addressed in his works was the positive role of the aristocracy both in Conservativism and in
British life. His works combined a mix of politics and ethics illustrating how he perceived the
development of government and political parties after the Reform Bill. Disraeli, like many other
Conservatives, questioned Peel’s post-Reform Bill idea of Conservativism. Disraeli’s core
critique was that Peel’s Conservativism lacked serious principles and his criticism manifested
itself in his writings. In his two most famous political novels, Coningsby or the New Generation
and Sybil or the Two Nations, Disraeli questioned the Conservativism that Peel had created and
argued that Conservativism should stand for a strong set of principles and values founded in
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Toryism.235 Disraeli, unlike his contemporary the novelist Charles Dickens’, argued that the
working classes should be led by an enlightened aristocracy. Disraeli’s political novels,
published respectively in 1844 and 1845 offered a critique of the direction of Conservativism
under Peel. He argued that Robert Peel’s Conservativism had failed to act on behalf of all
classes. In Sybil Disraeli proposed the idea that Conservativism should be representative of the
nation regardless of class identification. His notion of what would later be called one-nation
Conservativism was a critique of the ‘two nations’ (and Peel’s Conservativism) that were
developing in industrial Britain. Sybil traced the plight of the working classes of England and
argued that the aristocracy should take the initiative to protect the poor, leading many critics to
note that Sybil – and therefore Disraeli – advocated a return to a very medieval and paternalistic
relationship between the classes.236 The work also indicated Disraeli’s personal sympathies for
the Chartist movement; however, the main focus of the novel was the growing division of the
country because of industrialization. Disraeli argued that both the people and politics of Great
Britain had begun to divide into ‘two nations’. Disraeli outlined this problem through his
characters’ dialog,
Two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are
ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in
different zones or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different
breeding, are fed by different food, are opened by different manners, and are not
governed by the same laws’.
You speak of- ‘said Egremont hesitantly. ‘The rich and poor.’237
Disraeli had believed that Conservativism for one nation across all classes would keep and
maintain the important institutions of the state. Disraeli argued that by creating ‘two nations’
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and ignoring the negative changes associated with industrialization, the suffering of the working
classes at the hands of the manufacturers would only increase. Conservativism, Disraeli argued,
needed to be more than a veneer over old Toryism; it had to evolve from it to address the needs
of the people of England. Additionally, its origins in Toryism were an essential embodiment of a
national identity.238 Toryism, and Conservativism, Disraeli argued had the responsibility to the
nation to lead and to preserve it.239 Therefore to prevent the division of classes, Disraeli argued
Conservativism needed to have real substance, Conservativism had to be paternalistic.
His change of heart concerning Peel’s Conservativism was also in part an act of
vengeance against his idol for failing to recognize his genius. By 1841, Disraeli had, in his own
opinion, been the most loyal and supportive follower of Peel (since his election to office in 1837)
and felt that at the age of 37 he was ready for a cabinet position in Peel’s new Conservative
Ministry.240 A whole group of men younger than him, including Gladstone, Dalhousie, Lincoln,
and Cardwell were all given office. As each office was announced and filled Disraeli had felt
increasingly abandoned and brushed aside despite his loyalty to Peel. To Disraeli these men
represented the very best of the upper class English political crop and to be excluded devastated
him.241 In September of 1841 Disraeli wrote to Peel out of desperation, wanting to know why he
was passed over in cabinet appointments,
I confess to be unrecognized at this moment by you appears to me to be
overwhelming; and I appeal to your own heart to that justice and that
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magnanimity, which I feel are your characteristics to save me from an intolerable
humiliation- Believe me, dear Sir Robert242
Peel had little choice in the matter of denying the young politician, with virtually no experience,
a position in the cabinet. Although Disraeli had proved ambitious and skillful, Peel did not see
Disraeli as suitable for a cabinet position. His lack of experience and record gave Peel no choice
in the matter of passing over the young Conservative.243 Peel never wrote a reply to Disraeli who
in turn, never forgot Peel’s lack of respect. The letter Disraeli wrote to Peel would become a
point of contention down the road between the two men. Disraeli’s petition for office was
perhaps in part because he was overconfident in his own talents but more so because it was a
position that came with a salary. Regular MP’s were often unpaid and Disraeli’s earlier failures
in finance meant that he had acquired massive debts. Disraeli’s desire for office was twofold; he
was a man of immense ambition but he had also amassed huge debts. His debts, accounting to
roughly ₤30,000 (approx. ₤1.2 million in present values) were always a burden upon him despite
his marriage to a wealthy widow in 1839.244 He felt that a paid position could help soften the
burden of his debts as well as expand his political career. The debts from Disraeli’s failures in
finance and his extravagant lifestyle would not fully be paid off until 1849.245
Disraeli’s negative opinion of Peel and of his ‘reforms’ had a history which predated the
Prime Minister’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws. He saw Peel as early March of 1845 as a man
who would possibly modify the state institutions (especially the church) out of existence if such
reforms kept him in power. Peel, in Disraeli’s mind, was an agent supporting the ever increasing
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division of the nation by appeasing the Whigs through excessive and damaging reforms. His
disgust with Peel became heated after a discussion concerning agricultural interests and the Corn
Laws in March of 1845. Disraeli argued that Peel ought to resign over the matter, “Dissolve, if
you please, the Parliament you have betrayed, and appeal to the people, who, I believe, mistrust
you. For me there remains this at least—the opportunity of expressing thus publicly my belief
that a Conservative Government is an organised hypocrisy.”246 The effect produced in the House
by calling the Prime Minister’s government ‘an organised hypocrisy’ created a considerable
uproar. Disraeli’s comments, as he would later write, received a silent nod of approval from
some Backbench Tories. As he put it “the Tory gentlemen beneath the gangway who swelled the
chorus did so with downcast eyes, as if they yet hesitated to give utterance to feelings too long
and too painfully suppressed.”247 Disraeli’s speech in March of 1845 and his perceived
acknowledgment by backbench Tories began in his mind a Conservative opposition to Peel’s
reforms and leadership. Disraeli would go on to oppose Peel even more vocally following the
increase of the Maynooth Grant and by December of 1845 Disraeli would lead a backbench
revolt against the Prime Minister’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws.
Disraeli’s support of the Corn Laws was not bound by his belief in some antiquated
economic policy but rather from their symbolic importance. Disraeli had linked the Corn Laws to
the maintenance of the landed aristocracy and the structure it provided for a stable society.
Therefore, it was part of his argument that Peel’s movement against the Corn Laws was a
betrayal of traditional institutions and their conservation.248 Disraeli’s own opinions were made
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clear as early as 1843 in an address to his constituents at Shrewsbury, a point he would reiterate
again in December of 1845. He stated that “ I will not pledge myself to miserable questions of
6d. in 7s. 6d or 8s. of duties about corn… but what I want and what I wish to secure…is the
preponderance of the landed interest.”249Disraeli’s statement about the Corn Laws suggested that
he like other Protectionist supporters were not as concerned with the amounts of money
generated by the tariff or the need for protection as for the position of the landed class in the
state. The removal of the Corn Laws not only represented the takeover of economic policy by
the new middle classes but an abandonment of the traditional class in the management of the
economy and the nation. Disraeli attacked Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws as a betrayal
of Conservative/Tory values.
Of course, Disraeli was not the only Conservative who questioned Peel’s Conservativism.
The one who came to be the most vocal in the context of the Corn Law crisis was Lord George
Bentinck. His alliance with Benjamin Disraeli instigated a rebellion against the Prime Minister
from the backbenches, which brought down Peel’s Conservative leadership. As the Member of
Parliament for the borough of King’s Lynn250 Bentinck began his political career as a Whig but
fell into the New Conservative party of Robert Peel with other supporters of Lord Stanley.
Bentinck was a model old-line politician but in no sense of the word a Tory. He had crossed the
floor of the Commons from the Whigs in 1835 with Lord Stanley to join Peel’s new
Conservative party. As the epitome of a landed gentleman, Lord George Bentinck treated the
Commons more like a gentleman’s club than a house of government.251 Bentinck himself had
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rarely spoken in the House and was often absent until the Corn Law crisis; a crisis, which in his
opinion, reflected the very problem of a Conservative ideology. When Peel announced his
decision to repeal the Corn Laws Bentinck began to attack the polices of the Prime Minister.
Lord Bentinck was perhaps the perfect example of the protectionist branch in the
Conservative party. His efforts to maintain the Corn Laws were based on his beliefs in the
Protectionist cause but more so upon his beliefs concerning the aristocratic role of the landed
elites within the constitution. Like Disraeli, he did not see the Corn Laws as a superior economic
system; he saw them as a crucial link to the aristocracy’s role in government. Additionally like
many other Protectionists, Bentinck was much more inclined to support a system that had
worked historically. Repeal would result in the retreat of aristocratic power from the economic
development of the country. This explains why a country gentlemen, jockey, and aristocrat, who
until 1845 had remained largely unheard, became heavily involved in defending the Corn
Laws.252
In Disraeli’s biography of Bentinck, he observed his friend to be one of the strongest
supporters of Robert Peel. He argued that until the Corn Law crisis; “[h]is trust in that minster
was indeed absolute.”253 While Bentinck had reluctantly supported Peel’s policy over the
Maynooth Grant he grew suspicious of Peel’s actions towards state institutions, especially his
attitude towards the Corn Laws. When Peel announced his decision to repeal the Corn Laws in
their entirety Bentinck was outraged. He believed that Peel had betrayed the Conservative
values he had advocated in the election of 1841.254 Disraeli argued in his book, Lord George
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Bentinck: A Political Biography that until the Corn Law crisis Bentinck, like other
Conservatives, had been satisfied with Peel’s leadership. However, after Peel’s decision to
repeal the Corn Laws became known Bentinck lost all faith in Peel’s ability to act as a
Conservative leader. Instead Bentick and the other Protectionists saw him as someone who was
willing to retreat on “Conservative” issues in order to gain public approval.
Bentinck flew in the face of the Conservative establishment and argued that Peel had
abandoned the Conservative triumph of 1841 and the sentiments of his own party in favor of
taking an un-conservative direction.255 Disraeli argued that men like Bentinck soon represented
the majority within the Conservative party. Disraeli wrote that,
[I]f it could shown to the country, that the great bulk of the Conservative party
were true to their faith, and were not afraid, even against the fearful odds which
they would have to encounter, to proclaim it, the confidence and the courage of
the country would rally, and the party in the House of Commons would find
external sympathy and support.256
While men like Disraeli and Bentinck held optimistic views that their cause would gather support
Peel on the other hand argued against their cause. Peel’s rebuttal was that these Conservative
backbenchers were selfish and refused to think of the greater good.257 In reply, Bentinck argued
that his Tory rebellion was doing its “fair share of the government for the country.”258However,
Bentinck’s vocal attacks on Peel were more often than not counterproductive to the debate.
Bentinck’s ruthlessness, single-mindedness and determination, coupled with the anger and
ferocity with which he attacked Peel, gained the once silent member from Kings Lynn notoriety
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among the backbenchers. Bentinck became even more vocal concerning the widespread imperial
effects of repeal.
As a staunch Protectionist, Bentinck had believed in the maintenance of the Corn Laws
for both national and colonial security. While Bentinck was not a highly skilled orator he was
well versed in the facts and figures behind the free trade debate.259 His argument, much like
Disraeli’s, was that repeal of the Corn Laws was not so much about the pricing of grain but the
fundamental change of the institution of empire. He argued that repeal was not only a mistake
but an outright betrayal of the Canadian colonies.260 During the debates to repeal the Corn Laws
Bentinck stressed what he believed was an abandonment of the colonies to the uncertainty of the
market. During the third reading of the bill to repeal the Corn Laws in May of 1846 Bentinck
argued,
It was only in 1843 the Canada Corn Bill was passed, which was held to be a
compromise—almost a bargain—with our Canadian Colonies, …The Canadas
were then led to believe that that was a permanent measure; but three years had
not elapsed before all the capital which had been vested on the faith of that
measure was to be sacrificed by the adoption of a different system of commercial
policy.261
Bentinck and other Conservatives saw total repeal as an abandonment of that other core
institution of Conservativism, the Empire. A total repeal of the Corn Laws would, in Bentinck’s
mind, be tantamount to the economic abandonment of British North America, which less than
three years prior had been granted special treatment.262 Bentinck and other backbench rebels in
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1846 now argued that Peel’s pervious modifications to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 were clear
indications that Peel was moving the nation towards free trade.263 While this accusation against
Peel appears to illustrate his slow movement towards free trade, in reality Peel’s modifications in
1842-3 were designed to work within the system to make it more efficient rather than
fundamentally change it.
The bold attacks on Peel from the vocal partnership of Disraeli and Bentinck fueled the
backbencher revolt as more Conservatives joined the Protectionist cause to uphold the Corn
Laws. This partnership between Bentinck and Disraeli was derisively known by many, as the
“Jockey and the Jew”.264 Bentinck’s partnership with Disraeli gave political strength to the
young Disraeli and defeated suspicions that he was nothing but a disgruntled upstart who didn’t
know his proper place in the party.265 These two Protectionists began to organize an internal
Protectionist party of sorts within Peel’s Conservative ministry.
Their backbench revolt had expressed legitimate arguments concerning the question of
the Corn Laws. Repeal would mean an abandonment of empire, a further lessening of the
aristocracy’s power, and the collapse of a time tested economic system. Although Bentinck was
regarded as crass, his partnership with Disraeli made up for his often weakly driven speeches and
un-parliamentary attacks on Peel. Their joint actions in early 1846 increased the strength of the
backbench revolt insuring that if Peel succeeded in repealing the Corn Laws, it would be a
Pyrrhic victory, as it would certainly cost him the Premiership.
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While Disraeli and Bentinck emerged as the figureheads of the protectionist revolt in the
House of Commons it would be a different Conservative that took the leadership of the
Protectionists after they decided to split with Peel. Lord Stanley, who had joined Peel’s
Conservative party after his own Derby Dilly party collapsed, would emerge as the new leader.
His support for Peel, like Bentinck’s, remained constant until the decision to repeal the Corn
Laws.266 Stanley had supported Peel even with the Maynooth Grant but Peel’s decision to repeal
the Corn Laws was more than he could tolerate.267 The developing Corn Law crisis reshaped
how Stanley saw Peel and the future of the Conservative party. While no longer a member of the
House of Commons at the time of the Corn Law Crisis, (he had been elevated to the Lords in
1844) Lord Stanley remained the most cautious supporter of the protectionist rebellion.
Stanley’s elevation to the House of Lords in 1844 was met with unease by Peel. In
correspondence with Wellington, Peel indicated that the loss of Stanley in the Commons was
going to be difficult but the Duke assured Peel that Stanley would support his cause in the upper
chamber.268 From his position in the House of Lords, Stanley was pressured by Bentinck to
oppose Peel’s plan for total Corn Law repeal.269 However, this was not the route Stanley took,
he instead listened to Bentinck and agreed with him concerning the role of the Corn Laws but
refused to use the House of Lords to oppose the Prime Minister.270 It was Stanley’s objective to
maintain and preserve the Conservative party in order to prevent the radical Whigs from entering
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government. Creating a Protectionist rebellion in the House of Lords would have damaged the
Conservative party in his opinion beyond repair. Thus, although siding with Disraeli and
Bentinck privately, Stanley would not openly attack Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws
until Parliament resumed in early 1846. His criticism of the abolition of the Corn Laws became
clear only when Peel announced it was his government’s plan to repeal them to provide relief for
Ireland.271
Unlike Disraeli and Bentinck, Stanley did not see the Protectionist revolt at first as an
open rebellion against Peel, but rather as an issue of internal Conservative dissent. He also
refused to rally the ‘country gentlemen’ together to oppose Peel but soon realized the Corn Laws
were going to break the party regardless of his involvement.272 Stanley knew that a firm break
with Peel would not only give the Whigs political power but would also deprive Conservative
forces of office for the foreseeable future due to internal division. However, the deep
protectionist roots within the Conservative party shifted the internal disagreement over
protectionism into solid division. Disraeli and Bentinck’s rebellion had, by late 1845,
successfully ruptured the Conservative Party and taken the bulk of its members away from Peel’s
control. Their division of the Conservative party by the end of December 1845 had brought Peel
to the point of resignation. However, John Russell’s failed attempt to form a minority
government meant that when Parliament resumed in January Peel would be back at the frontlines
attempting to repeal the Corn Laws. Disraeli and Bentinck’s forces would now launch an all-out
assault on Peel in order to prevent him from passing repeal in the Commons.
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By January of 1846, it was clear that repeal of the Corn Laws would devastate the unity
of the Conservative party. Russell’s failed attempt to form a government meant that Peel had to
repeal the Corn Laws alone. The Duke of Wellington wrote in early January that even he did not
know the intentions of Robert Peel when it came to the Corn Laws.273 However, he also stated
that whatever the course Peel had decided upon, he, the Duke of Wellington, would support him.
The division between the Protectionists in the House and those still loyal to Peel was going to
split on a final vote for Corn Law repeal or perhaps even before then. While Disraeli and
Bentinck professed outrage at Peel and his supporters for their apostasy, Stanley remained level
headed and wanted to mitigate the damage and look for a way to reunite the factions before an
impasse was created dividing ‘conservatives’ again.274 For his part Bentinck would not consider
compromise or a reunification. In his opinion, Peel’s apostasy had been final and his objective
now was to prevent Peel and his allies from passing repeal before the next election.275
The final blows came in late April 1846, as both Disraeli and Bentinck ramped up their
attacks against Peel. It was their intention to prevent Peel from repealing the Corn Laws by any
means possible. Bentinck’s fierce attacks on Peel made it clear that division of the Conservative
party and the humiliation of Sir Robert Peel was the only acceptable avenue of victory for the
Protectionists.276 Disraeli’s eloquent attacks on Peel stressed that Peel had undeniably betrayed
Conservative values and side stepped the decision of the electorate in 1841 in favor of Whig and
Anti-Corn Law League appeasement. In early May of 1846 the division of the Conservative
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party was finalized with a vote of total repeal in the House of Commons. For his final assault on
Peel, Disraeli offered the most scathing and destructive verbal attack on the man he had once
idolized. His speech against the Prime Minister on May 15th 1846 was a culmination of both
his hatred of Peel, his belief in the protectionist cause and the fiery rhetoric he had mastered as a
writer. Disraeli’s infamous speech fired every personal attack imaginable at Peel and his
supporters. Disraeli characterized them as,
…political peddlers that bought their party in the cheapest market, and sold us in
the dearest. I know, Sir, that there are many who believe that the time is gone by
when one can appeal to those high and honest impulses that were once the
mainstay and the main element of the English character. I know, Sir, that we
appeal to a people debauched by public gambling, stimulated and encouraged by
an inefficient and shortsighted Minister. I know that the public mind is polluted
with economic fancies; a depraved desire that the rich may become richer without
the interference of industry and toil. I know, Sir, that all confidence in public men
is lost. 277
The destructive criticism offered by Disraeli put an end to Peel’s leadership of the Conservative
party. However, his attack did not end at accusing Peel of selling the party to the highest bidder,
it also labeled Peel as ‘a burglar of others’ intellect’ and claimed that his career had been a crime
of petty larceny on a grand scale.278 This verbal assault on Peel was not only viewed as a
shocking and unheard of criticism of the Prime Minister, but a final act of division between the
Peelites and protectionists.279 Disraeli’s attack humiliated Peel and left his supporters in the
House of Commons speechless. Peel’s loyalists and the supporters of Disraeli and Bentinck’s
rebellion were from this moment on at each other’s throats. Peel’s response to Disraeli’s speech
was a direct attack on the character of Disraeli, whom Peel believed was dissatisfied because of
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his lack of a cabinet appointment in 1841.280 With Peel’s counter Disraeli had entered into a
savage verbal sparring match, which if he was not careful would cost him his newly acquired
prestige among the Protectionists. His response to Peel’s accusation, especially concerning the
letter he had written in 1841, was an outright lie. Disraeli claimed he had never petitioned the
Prime Minister for office in 1841 (hoping that Peel would not bring forward the letter in
question).281 The incriminating letter was not presented by Peel for unknown reasons, securing
Disraeli’s political gamble.282
The third reading of the bill to repeal the Corn Laws dealt the final blow to any hopes
Peel had about maintaining any form of Conservative unity. Roughly two thirds of his own party
voted against his call to repeal the Corn Laws in order to provide relief for the growing famine in
Ireland. Peel was only able to enact repeal with significant support from the Whigs. However,
some historians have suggested that protectionism itself was a divisive issue to both parties
although more so to Peel’s Conservatives than the Whigs.283 With a final tally of 355 in favor of
repeal and 245 opposed, (Table 2) the Corn Laws were to be repealed.
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Votes on the Third Reading of the Bill to Repeal the Corn Laws, 15 May 1846
For Repeal
No.

For Repeal
Percent

Against
Repeal No.

Against
Totals
Repeal
Percent
32
241
68
355
Conservatives 114
235
96
10
4
245
Whigs
Table 2 Division of Conservative party in the repeal of the Corn Laws284
Disraeli and Bentinck’s rebellion had divided the Conservative party. Disraeli’s scathing
criticism of Peel and the backbench revolt had effectively terminated Peel’s political career as
the Conservative leader. Peel had been ousted from the Conservative leadership for breaking
with what the backbenchers saw as proper Conservative principles.
Once the House Commons approved repeal it passed to the Lords. In the House of Lords
a puzzling series of events transpired. While the Lords remained the bastion of landed privilege
very little was argued over Corn Law repeal. Only Lord Stanley spoke against the government’s
decision to repeal the Corn Laws. 285 Stanley’s three hour speech denouncing the government’s
repeal of the Corn Laws on the 25th of May 1846 illustrated his commitment to the protectionist
revolt against Peel. He had argued that repeal of the Corn Laws was a revocation of a national
policy, which in one shape or another, traced back to the days of Edward IV. 286 Historians have
investigated this series of events and have labeled it as “Peel’s puzzle.” The historian Norman
Gash’s explanation for swift passage in the Lords, was that the Duke of Wellington’s strict
military discipline and style of leadership over that chamber, had allowed the Lords to support
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Peel’s decision despite being against the members’ interests.287 However, other historians have
suggested that both Peel and Wellington convinced the Lords that failure to accept repeal could
result in a democratic backlash whereas repeal would conserve their political privileges. This
explanation seems a more likely fit with Peel’s form of Conservativism that only through
necessary reform could the rule of the aristocracy be maintained. In August of 1846, Peel wrote
that although repeal of the Corn Laws broke the Conservative party he believed it was the most
Conservative act of his life and that his sacrifice of power would inevitably uphold the principles
of the nation.288
Bentinck argued that efforts made to include Canada within the protectionist system less
than three years prior had been swept away in one clean stroke. The Canadian Corn bill and
efforts made to build an imperial system of preference were now abandoned. Moreover, an
abandonment of the Corn Laws was now an abandonment of the colonies of Canada.289 Repeal
of the Corn Laws, in Stanley’s mind, was not only a regressive policy but it undermined national
self-sufficiency, surrendering national and Imperial self-sufficiency to the whims of the free
market – all in the name of Irish relief.290 The resignation of Lord Stanley on June 28th 1846,
from the Peel cabinet, initiated the physical collapse of the Conservative party. While Stanley’s
resignation from the government had been long withheld his exit in June symbolized the
termination of Robert Peel as de facto Conservative leader. Nevertheless, Stanley’s departure and
Peel’s termination as de facto leader did not mean the end of Tamworth Conservativism. Stanley
287

Norman Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction in English Politics, 1832-1852 (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1965), 54.
288

Robert Peel, Memoirs by the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel. ed. Edward Cardwell & Lord Mahon 2.

289

Corn Importation Bill-Adjourned Debate- (Third Night), May 15, 1846. Hansard, 3rd Series Vol. LXXXVI §
§226-99 620.
290

Disraeli, Lord George Bentinck, 7.

102

believed that the division caused by the Corn Law crisis would eventually heal and the party
would reconcile sometime in the near future.291
While Peel had succeeded in repealing the Corn Laws he had failed to maintain his young
party’s unity within the terms of his Tamworth Conservativism. Peel’s resignation from the
office of Prime Minister the next day on the 29th of June 1846 signaled the official end of his
leadership of both the United Kingdom and the Conservative party. While his supporters wished
to see Peel as the head of a new Peelite party he refused and argued against the formation of
another ‘Conservative’ party. The Conservative schism after the repeal of the Corn Laws became
a final and seemingly irrevocable division. Roughly two thirds of his own party had opposed his
position on the Corn Laws and sought his removal. Peel had revived the Tories but during the
course of the Corn Law crisis had watched them retreat into reactionary polices for the second
time in a generation.292 The repeal of the Corn Laws had made Peel a number of political
enemies in every corner of the House. Those remaining loyal to Peel gave their support to the
formation of a new “liberal’ Conservative party.293
Still, the Conservative schism over the Corn Laws was not the end of the Conservative
party. The Conservatives quickly began to reorganize around the remaining leaders; Stanley,
Disraeli, and Bentinck. These men became the leading faces of Conservativism in the postrepeal era. Although most of the talent and the frontbench left with Peel, two thirds of the party
in the Commons stayed with Bentinck and Disraeli. While Disraeli and Bentinck became the
effective leaders in the Commons, the more levelheaded Stanley took control as ‘Conservative’
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leader.294 His hesitancy to re-form the party around the ‘Protectionist’ label defined him as a
careful leader that would help rebuild Conservativism after the Corn Law crisis. Stanley knew
whatever kind of Conservative organization that survived, he would be its designated leader
rather than the fiery Lord Bentinck or the power hungry Disraeli.295
Peel had believed in a modernized Tory party that had accepted the changes made after
1832 and would pursue necessary reform. Peel had succeeded to a certain extent but where he
failed was in his judgement of just how far the party would be willing to go. The Conservative
rebels Disraeli, Bentinck, and Stanley had no desire to return to a pre-Reform Bill Tory party but
had believed Peel had been pressured by the ACLL and the Whigs to pursue a reform that was
neither absolutely necessary nor wise. The Protectionists were reluctant to accept many of Peel’s
more open compromises (Maynooth and Corn Law repeal) but still had to acknowledge him for
the fundamental changes he had initiated in the process of modernizing Toryism. Differences
over what constituted a proper Conservative ideology through the trials of the Corn Law crisis
may have unseated Peel and deprived the Conservatives of power for a generation, but repeal
forced the remaining Conservatives to reexamine themselves and rebuild Conservativism starting
in 1846.
The Conservative split over the repeal of the Corn Laws was incredibly harsh upon
Conservativism itself. Peel had worked to build a new type of political party that would pursue
reform and seek to better the institutions of the state through those reforms. His Tamworth
Conservativism was designed from the start to act on reforms when necessary. The Corn Law
crisis had been an example of necessary reform Peel knew he had to pursue. Peel’s decision to
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repeal the Corn Laws has been argued to have been a fundamental change in his Conservative
ideology. However, much like his decision to support Catholic emancipation in 1828 Peel
believed himself to be was working to preserve another institution of the state, the aristocracy.
Earlier attempts to reform the Corn Laws had worked for both Peel and his Conservatives but
when total repeal became necessary many of his Conservatives thought Peel had abandoned his
principles rather than remaining consistent. However, his decision to conserve larger institutions
of the state was, in 1846, in his opinion, a profoundly Conservative action.296Whatever Peel’s
stance on protection was in 1841 or the exact nature of his supposed ‘conversion’ to free trade in
1845, what remains consistent and important in the history of Peel’s own politics was the idea of
the necessity of reform to protect what he perceived to be the larger interests of the nation.
***
Peel’s second ministry was a case of triumph turned into tragedy. He had succeeded on
one hand by transforming the Tories into a new and modernized political organization. He had
passed reforms to the Corn Laws and Factory Acts with strong support from his fellow
Conservatives. However, this success turned to tragedy starting in 1845. Peel’s decision to
expand the Maynooth Grant sparked a long held suspicion that he was betraying Conservative
principles. With news of the potato blight in autumn of 1845 Peel, in order to provide relief,
announced that he had decided to repeal the Corn Laws. This announcement created outrage
within the party and fueled an ideological split. Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws
transformed his triumph of 1841 into a Conservative tragedy in 1846. The division of the
Conservative party in 1846 resulted in a failure by Peel to see a full application of his Tamworth
Conservativism as the official party doctrine.
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However, the application of Tamworth Conservativism as the official party doctrine did
not fail entirely. Until the Corn Law crisis (or at least the Maynooth Grant) a majority of his
party accepted his idea of necessary reform as a way to preserve institutions of the state. Even
Peel’s great opponent Benjamin Disraeli had praised Peel for this type of forward thinking. 297
Peel’s reforms to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 were met with Conservative support and his reforms
to the Factory Act were even expanded and pushed further independent of Peel. The application
of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism had, until the Corn Law crisis, succeeded in transforming
the Tories into a modernized political party. Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism failed during the
Corn Law crisis not because it was a weak ideology but because the Tories were still in the
process of being transformed into Conservatives. Stanley’s takeover as leader of the party, postrepeal, illustrated the ongoing transformation because despite his beliefs about protection and the
Corn Laws, Stanley and, to a lesser extent, Disraeli were looking to reconcile the two groups of
Conservatives within one party. The irony in the post repeal Conservative party would be that the
second application of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism would be carried out by the very people
that had unseated him in 1846. Their return to Peel’s founding ideas would solidify the political
discourse that Peel had initiated in 1834.
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CHAPTER IV
THE LEGACY OF TAMWORTH CONSERVATISM
By the end of June of 1846, the collapse of the Conservative party had been finalized.
The backbench revolt had caused a schism within the young Conservative party over the repeal
of the Corn Laws. With the Corn Laws effectively repealed, Peel had resigned as Prime Minister.
His resignation and retreat from leadership signaled a crisis within the Conservative party.
Stanley’s departure from the Cabinet the day before Peel’s resignation on June 28th had
formalized the creation of a Protectionist faction within the majority of the Conservative party.298
The chaos of the Corn Law crisis had deprived the remaining Conservatives of their leaders and
left the new Peelite faction without a sizeable body in the Commons. This problem forced the
remaining Conservative party leaders to establish an ideology that separated them from the
Peelites and which could become the basis of a re-imagined party.
However, it was not a simple task confronting the Conservative rebels. A new party for a
new age was something Peel himself had attempted to build in 1834 with his Tamworth
Manifesto. Stanley, Bentinck, and Disraeli as the triumvirate of new Conservative leaders had to
reform the Conservative party and either accept the repeal of the Corn Laws or continue to fight
what appeared to be the losing battle for protectionism. Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism after
1846 would diverge into two directions under new leadership. The Peelite faction would attempt
to assert its independence but, until the death of Peel in 1850, the Peelite ideology remained
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rather stagnant. The Protectionists meanwhile would struggle with protectionism for another six
years before officially casting it off as a party policy. A redesign of Conservativism after the
Corn Law crisis became a question of principles that both the Peelites and Protectionists faced.
While Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism remained part of the central framework, a new series of
changes arose that helped to reshape his Conservativism in the post repeal era.

Peelite Conservatism beyond the Corn Law Crisis
The repeal of the Corn Laws had essentially divided Conservativism into two groups in
1846, the “Liberal’ Peelites and the Protectionist Tories. Despite the major difference separating
the two Conservative ‘parties’ – essentially the question of free trade– the Peelites and
Protectionists still shared a common core Conservativism.299 However, the rift created by the
fight to repeal the Corn Laws was much larger and more personal than a disagreement over free
trade. Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws had left his party in shambles and he was not
prepared for the political outcomes of repeal. Peel had professed that repeal was a Conservative
action, however, the Protectionist rebellion illustrated that he and his party were not on the same
page. His resignation as leader of the Conservative party and refusal to become the leader of the
Peelite ‘party’ left his post-repeal loyalists in a difficult position. For the Peelites the lack of
leadership from Robert Peel was highly problematic. Peel’s loyalists did not want to force him
to act as a leader but his reluctance to do so left them questioning his leadership..
On the same night in which Wellington was able to pass repeal through the Lords Peel’s
Irish Coercion bill was defeated in the commons 292 to 219. The defeat of this Bill brought a
formal end to Peel’s tenure as Prime minister. His defeat and resignation, although finalized by
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the failed attempt to pass an Irish Coercion Bill, was clearly the result of the repeal of the Corn
Laws. To that end Peel’s resignation speech recognized the skill of the ACLL orator and MP
Richard Cobden. As Peel put it, “the name which ought to be and will be associated with the
success of these measures is the name of Richard Cobden. Without scruple, Sir, I attribute the
success of these measures to him.”300 Peel’s mention of Cobden in his resignation speech was a
deliberate rubbing of salt in his party’s wounds. The resignation of Sir Robert Peel was
illustrated in the July 11th edition of Punch. Titled Manager Peel Taking his Farewell Benefit
Peel is seen receiving praise from all corners of the stage except from the lone figure of
Benjamin Disraeli, who is shaking his fist in disgust at Peel.301 Disraeli was mocked again by
Punch in the January 1847 issue. Punch’s ridicule of Disraeli in the cartoon titled The Rising
Generation in Parliament illustrated the foppish upstart plotting his next move against Peel and
Parliament (Figure 2.2).302 In the cartoon, Peel asks Disraeli “Well, My little man, what are you
going to do this session Eh!” Disraeli responds with “Why-aw-aw-I’ve made arraignments-awto-smash-aw-everybody.”
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Figure 2. The Rising Generation in Parliament
Punch’s depiction of Disraeli in 1847 illustrated both the continued division of Conservative
forces and the widespread mistrust of Disraeli after his brutal treatment of Peel in June of 1846.
Many of the Peelites felt Disraeli’s attacks on the Prime Minster were completely uncalled for
and could not see themselves reunited with a ‘snake in the grass’ such as he. Likewise the
Protectionists were not too keen on a reunification either as they believed Peel had been
abandoning Conservative institutions right and left in favor of national prestige and Whig
appeasement.303
For the next four years both the Protectionists and Peelites sat on the same front bench
with Peel and Disraeli only three seats away from one another.304 Peel, after his resignation,
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retreated to the life of an average MP. However, the former premier could not simply withdraw
himself and expect to be left alone. Although he continued to represent the borough of
Tamworth Peel refrained from entering major political debates or acting as a figurehead to his
Conservative loyalists. In a letter to Peel the Duke of Bedford stated that the moment Peel had
chosen to repeal the Corn Laws was perfect. By suffering the political ramifications, Peel had
acted as a true Conservative to preserve the nation from the class warfare that surely could have
developed had the Corn Laws remained.305In his own opinion Peel agreed with the Duke of
Bedford and believed that repealing the Corn Laws was a profoundly Conservative action.306 It
was this belief that kept many of the Peelites from joining with Russell’s Whigs. His Peelites
had a foot in both parties but were part of neither.
One of Peel’s greatest supporters, W.E. Gladstone, followed Peel to support repeal and
became an important figure in the Peelite faction. Gladstone despised what the Protectionists,
especially Disraeli, had done to Peel and, together with Sir James Graham and the Earl of
Aberdeen, formed the core of the Peelite leadership in the post repeal era.307However, Gladstone
was critical of Peel’s defeatism and Peel’s complete refusal to lead the Peelite faction as he had
lead the Conservative party before. Gladstone wrote that “in the midst of the struggle he [Peel]
came to feel its real intensity he seems in his own mind to have substituted indifference about the
destruction of the party which was so eminently HIS.”308 The Conservative schism that had
occurred over the Corn Laws had broken the party and politics of Peel. Gladstone argued that
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Peel should take back control over what he had created: “It might have been in his power to
make some provision for the holding together, or for the reconstruction, of that great party which
he has reared”.309As Gladstone had argued, Peel seemingly remained defeated by the beating he
had suffered at the hands of Disraeli and his refusal to move towards reconciliation meant that
the party he had created, based on his principles and ideas, remained completely estranged from
him.
Gladstone was not alone in his criticism of Peel’s defeatist attitude. Peel’s close associate
and former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Henry Goulburn, petitioned Peel in late December of
1846, and argued that Peel should lead the Peelites as a new party against the Protectionists.
Goulburn wrote,
My own view is that the position which we ought to take would be one of
observation rather than of party opposition to the government, showing ourselves
constantly alive to the real interests of the country, neither refusing to support the
government in opposing the mad projects of the Protectionists310
Goulburn’s petition to Peel suggested a middle ground for the Peelites. They could oppose the
Protectionists by supporting Russell but they should also oppose Russell on certain issues to state
their own Conservative independence. Peel’s reply to Goulburn illustrated that such appeals were
to no avail. The personal abuse he had taken from Disraeli and Bentinck over protectionism had
been so devastating that he could not- or would not- seek office again, and was unwilling to lead
the Peelites as a new party. Peel wrote back to Goulburn arguing,
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As I am not prepared to enter into that combination-as from feeling which I
cannot control the necessity of resuming power would be perfectly odious to me. I
am wholly disqualified for the reorganization of a party.311
Peel’s defeatist attitude towards party reorganization after repeal meant that while he was the
‘leader’ of the Peelites he refused to actually lead them anywhere. Since repeal the majority of
the frontbench had abandoned the Conservative party, and formed the Peelite faction. Arguably
the Peelites had a strong talent pool, but with the lack of guidance and direction from Peel it left
many questioning the future of the Peelite faction.
The four years after repeal were ones of great frustration for Peel’s loyalists. His
defeatist attitude and refusal to act as a leader meant that his supporters were stuck between the
Whigs and the Protectionists with virtually no direction. Peelite Conservatives like Gladstone
and Goulburn expressed disappointment with Peel. Their disapproval of Peel’s leadership
centered around his desire to have them support every measure of the Whig government without
any restriction. Their criticism in this regard was that if they were to support the government
unconditionally how could they maintain their independence as Peelites? Gladstone and
Goulburn set up meetings in 1849 with Peel to discuss their policy over the repeal of the
Navigation Acts. To their embarrassment, Peel was unwilling to support any kind of
‘conditional legislation’ for Peelite support of repeal and desired to see Russell’s government
remain undefeated.312 Peel believed that a second battle over free trade and protection would
take place if Russell’s government was defeated, and that to prevent a re-imposition of
protectionism, Russell’s government had to stand.313This unconditional support for the
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government was tolerated by many of the Peelites and the Navigation Acts were successfully
repealed.
To the Peelites, the repeal of the Navigation Acts signaled the last hope the Protectionists
had to reinstate protectionism. As Graham wrote, “they are carrying on a Conservative
Government, and to keep the ship afloat they have to pitch over, day by day.”314Graham’s
metaphor of bailing out a sinking ship illustrated that the Protectionist support of protectionism
was slowly undoing itself. The reality as of late 1849 was that protectionist principles were
becoming more and more unfashionable and unrealistic. Therefore many of the Peelites did not
share Peel’s fear of a coming second battle of protection versus free trade. They believed that
sooner, rather than later, the Protectionists had to abandon protectionism for their own sake.
Peel’s fear of the Protectionists implementing a New Corn Law was, by late 1849, becoming
increasingly unrealistic. However he still believed that until the Protectionists could no longer reintroduce protection the Peelites had to support the Russell government in all its endeavors.315
For four years, the Peelites had given the Whig government their firm support, in every
matter of policy. Their alliance remained close until the Don Pacifico debate of 1850. This
incident illustrated that although Peel believed in supporting the Whigs, to prevent the revival of
Protectionism, Peel and the Peelites had not entered into a union with Russell’s party.316 Peel’s
response to the government’s (especially Lord Palmerston’s) actions during the Don Pacifico
affair illustrated his dedication to Conservative principles. To him the irresponsible behavior on
the part of the government went against the principle of a careful approach to all matters for the
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good of the nation that he had advocated for his entire life. The debate focused on the
compensation of a British subject who had been attacked in Athens. The subject, Don Pacifico,
had appealed to the Greek government for compensation for loss of property and when that was
denied he appealed to the British. It was in Peel’s opinion that the response by the British
government to pressure the Greeks, through military blockade, to compensate Pacifico was
outrageous. The blockading of Greece’s main port by a British naval squadron caused
diplomatic tensions between Greece and Britain, which was supposedly under British protection.
This poorly managed diplomacy was something which Peel felt was not right, and he argued that
the Peelites ought not to remain silent. The speech Peel delivered on June 28th 1850 was his last
recorded speech in the House of Commons and was one not unworthy of being his final political
statement. Lord Palmerston had argued that it was the duty of the British government to protect
its citizens all over the world and he invoked the phrase ‘Civis Romanus sum’ (I am a Roman
citizen) to support his reasoning.317 Peel’s response showed no compromise of principle in its
delivery. He argued that Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston’s actions in securing compensation
for the British subject Don Pacifico were extreme and not an act of careful, well thought out
diplomacy. As Peel argued,
Diplomacy is a costly engine for maintaining peace, a remarkable instrument used
by civilised nations for the purpose of preventing war. Unless it be used to
appease the angry passions of individual men and check the feelings which arise
out of national resentment, it is an instrument not only costly but mischievous.318
Peel’s final speech concerning the approach by the government to such diplomacy suggested that
such actions were not only rash but also outright irresponsible. The government should not have
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taken such a heavy-handed action and acted without careful consideration for the broader
national interest, the main touchstone of Peel’s entire career.
Tragically, the very next day, while out riding Peel was thrown from his horse and
succumbed to his injuries only three days later on July 2nd 1850. The Prime Minister, John
Russell’s tribute to Peel, noted that Peel’s actions both before and during the Corn Law crisis had
crafted him into the finest statesman of his age.319 The Conservative/Protectionist reaction to
Peel’s death also came with praise, despite the remaining feelings of his betrayal over
protectionism. Disraeli wrote that despite Peel’s desertion from his own party twice (Catholic
emancipation and the Corn Laws) he was able to accomplish reforms of which the Whigs could
only have dreamed.320 Peel’s legacy was recognized by his allies and opponents alike. Peel’s
Tamworth Conservativism had established the fundamental idea behind a political party based
around the preservation of institutions central to the state through careful reform. His Tamworth
Manifesto was the key document behind this idea, and outlined how Conservativism was to
approach reform and guide institutions of the state from the past into the present.
With the untimely death of Peel the leadership of the Peelites shifted to W.E. Gladstone,
Henry Goulburn, the Earl of Aberdeen, and Lord Ripon.321 While each of these former
Conservatives had been critical of Peel in his last four years of life, they still remained followers
of his Tamworth Conservativism. With Peel dead, the continuation of the Peelites as an
independent party became difficult. Their alliance with the Whigs for the past four years had
created a strong bond. Additionally, the Peelites had voted unconditionally with the Whig

319

M. Guizot. Memoirs of Sir Robert Peel (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street 1857), 357.

320

Disraeli. Whigs and Whiggism, 337.

321

Lord Ripon had over the course of his career been a Tory, Whig, Stanlyite, Conservative, and Peelite.

116

government on nearly every occasion with the Don Pacifico debate being the sole exception.
Peel’s death in1850 cemented the division between the Peelites and Stanley’s
Conservative/Protectionist party. Gladstone himself had refused to rejoin the party in which his
great rival Benjamin Disraeli had unseated his hero Sir Robert Peel.322 Gladstone, now at the
helm of the Peelite party, would eventually become the quintessential Victorian Liberal based on
the ideas of Robert Peel. His rivalry with Disraeli would see both aspects of Peel’s politics
(liberal and conservative) played out as the two dominant forms of political thought throughout
the second half of the nineteenth century.323
Peel’s coalition with the Whigs was an unhappy marriage, but one that he (and the
Peelites) infinitely preferred to one with the Protectionists. His last four years of life have been
observed by historians and his contemporaries alike to be the anti-climax to his political
career.324 However, his ‘defeatism’ as Gladstone had portrayed it, was not without motivation.
Peel’s unquestioning support for the Whigs, until his death, was done to ensure that when
Stanley’s Conservatives/Protectionists regained control of the government they would be unable
to re-impose protection. This strategy to prevent a return to protection, some historians have
argued, was why Peel never took the Peelite faction and fashioned it as a new political party.
Other historians like Boyd Hilton have argued that Peel’s support of the Whigs helped to fashion
an alliance that would become the Liberal party. 325 Whatever the case, Peel’s refusal to act as a
leader of the Peelites, and his aversion to a return to office meant that his personal role in
shaping Conservativism had ended. The final years of Sir Robert Peel’s life saw the torch of his
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Tamworth Conservativism being passed on to others. While his Peelite supporters namely
Aberdeen, Goulburn, and Gladstone, remained highly critical of Peel’s defeatist attitude after
1846, they would be instrumental in advancing their versions of Peel’s ideology in the Peelite
and later Liberal parties.

The Remaking of the Conservative Party
Conversely, the Protectionists lead by Stanley, Bentinck, and Disraeli had to fashion their
own party in the post-repeal era to separate it from Peel. The attempts to return to protection after
the Conservative schism did not work thanks to the Peelite support for the Whig government.
Additionally, the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849 signaled an increasingly difficult battle
for the Protectionists. With both the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts repealed Stanley had
argued that the Protectionists should return to calling themselves ‘Conservatives’ in order to
distance themselves from the growingly unpopular issue of Protectionism. Bentinck had rejected
Stanley’s earlier suggestion in 1848 to return to calling themselves ‘the Conservative party’ and
advocated calling the party ‘the Protectionists’. While Bentinck had some support, building a
party on such a single idea (economic protectionism) was not a long term plan likely to win the
support of the electorate. Stanley’s attempt to return to the Conservative label was the first step
towards a return to Peel’s Tamworth Conservative message.326 As the leading advocate Stanley
could not have been a better candidate. His earlier Knowsley Creed nearly mirrored Peel’s
Tamworth Manifesto and the Conservativism they both shared. A decision by the Protectionists
to return to Tamworth Conservativism in 1852 was decided upon only after a serious
reorganization of the Conservative party, the death of a leading Protectionist and defeat of
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protectionism itself. Stanley’s objective in his return to Tamworth Conservativism was in part a
way to reconcile the differences between the Protectionists and the Peelites but more
importantly as a way to maintain a Conservative force to oppose what he saw as the destruction
of state institutions under the pretext of reform.327
In the aftermath of the Corn Law crisis the Protectionists had retreated into opposition.
While the Protectionist leadership struggled to maintain some type of control over the party it did
not fade like the Tory party had after the Reform Bill. The Conservative/Protectionist party from
1846 until 1852 had remained a legitimate opposition to the Whigs and Peelites despite its
internal fracture over the Corn Laws. The new Protectionist leaders, struggled to reestablish the
party. Repeal had devastated the electoral majority that the Conservatives once had, and the
Peelite support of the Whig government contributed to a brain drain of the party’s best talents.
Table 3 shows how the Conservative party fared in the elections of 1847 and 1852. Official
figures for the Peelites were counted into the Conservative block despite internal party
difference. Rough estimates suggest that out of the 325 Conservatives in 1847 about 1/3 (112)
were Peelites and after the death of Peel (1850) the number had dropped further (80) by 1852 as
more either returned to the Conservative party or joined the Whigs.
General Election Results 1847 & 1852
1847
213/112 (325)
Conservatives/Peelites
292
Whigs
36
Irish Repeal
1
Chartist
Table 3 Election results for 1847 & 1852328
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1852
250/80 (330)
324
0
0

Stanley and Bentinck’s dual leadership had to rebuild Conservativism as a way to prove to the
electorate, that despite their opposition to repeal of the Corn Laws, theirs was the party most
dedicated to preserving and maintaining the important institutions of the state. In comparison
Stanley was clearly a much better leader and more pragmatic than Bentinck. However, from his
position in the House of Lords he had very little control over the Protectionists in the House and
he needed Bentinck’s assistance to help him in the reestablishment of the Conservative party.329
The leadership of the Protectionist party in the House of Commons from 1846-1852, fell
to the partnership of Bentinck and Disraeli. With Stanley in the House of Lords, Bentinck
became the new ‘Conservative’ leader in the House of Commons. While Bentinck seems an odd
choice, rather than the more cunning Disraeli, it was actually the most logical. Bentinck, the son
of a Duke (William Bentinck 4th Duke of Portland), was the best representative the Protectionists
could have and trust. Disraeli on the other hand was not a landed aristocrat and as the son of a
converted Jew he was still perceived as an outsider. Additionally, his ungentlemanly attacks,
both personal and political, against Peel made him a suspicious figure, even to the Protectionists.
Bentinck, now the head of the Protectionist Conservatives in the Commons, took every
opportunity to attack the Peelites with ferocity equal to that which he had demonstrated during
the Corn Law debates. In one instance, Bentinck offended Gladstone so badly that any
reconciliation with Gladstone and other leading Peelites proved impossible.330 Stanley, as head
of the Protectionist Conservatives, attempted to keep Bentinck in check but Bentinck seemed to
follow his own rules. The growing rift between Bentinck and Stanley was not going to heal
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anytime soon and Bentinck’s leadership in the Commons seemed to take direction away from
Stanley as Conservative party leader.
The election of 1847 had seen the election of a single Jewish member, who like Daniel
O’Connell (A Catholic Irishman) twenty years earlier, was prohibited from sitting in the House.
The Whig government had proposed an amendment allowing the member to sit but Stanley and
other Conservatives opposed the measure. However, both Bentinck and Disraeli (for personal
reasons), supported the Bill to emancipate the Jews. Disraeli’s speech in support of this measure
was received by the government as brave but called blasphemous by his own party. His
statement: “where is your Christianity if you do not believe in their Judaism?" was not well
received by Stanley or many other Protectionists. 331 The bill passed its third reading in the
Commons in May 1848 but was defeated by Stanley and the Protectionists in the House of
Lords. Bentinck’s subsequent resignation as Conservative leader in the Commons was a direct
result of his failure to gather sufficient Protectionist support for the Jewish emancipation bill.
Bentinck’s resignation left a gaping hole in the leadership of the Commons. Stanley
pleaded with Bentinck to reconsider his resignation but Bentinck refused. With Disraeli
suggested as a potential candidate Stanley instead offered the position to the Marquess of
Granby. Stanley’s mistrust of Disraeli remained strong both after his ‘blasphemous’ speech over
Jewish emancipation and his memorable verbal destruction of the former Prime Minister.
However, Granby upon realizing the weight of the office, resigned and the Conservative
Protectionists in the Commons were left without a leader.332 Bentinck still refused to return to
the post and Stanley, hesitant to pass up Disraeli a second time, left the post vacant. In his
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opinion, as long as Bentinck was still in the Commons, he could act as unofficial leader and
Stanley could avoid dealing with Disraeli.
By early 1848 Stanley had given up on reviving Protectionism and had resolved upon a
return to Conservativism. 333 The greatest opponent to this abandonment was, of course, Lord
George Bentinck. In his exchanges with Bentinck, Stanley made it clear that the political
atmosphere had changed, and that a leader and his party had to act in unison. Stanley wrote to
Bentinck explaining the fundamental problem of Peel’s government was that he failed to follow
his own party. As he put it, “Peel’s great error had always been disregarding the opinion of his
party, whenever it did not exactly square with his own; and I am confident that no man in these
days can hope to lead a party who cannot make up his mind sometime to follow it.”334 Stanley’s
comment to Bentinck was designed to mitigate some of the damages between the two and realign
the Protectionist leadership in both Houses. But it was impossible for Bentinck to accept the
‘appeasement’ of free trade. To accept the repeal of the Corn Laws and the abandonment of
protectionism was to accept Peel’s Conservative apostasy, the very thing he had risen to fight
against.
In one sense Stanley’s problem of leadership in the Commons deepened when, late in
September of 1848, Lord George Bentinck’s body was discovered after he failed to arrive at a
dinner party. The unexpected death of Bentinck from a heart attack meant that once again
Stanley was going to have to address the issue of party leader in the Commons. Before his death
Bentinck had been acting as the unofficial party leader in the Commons. With Bentinck dead,
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Disraeli quickly took it upon himself to act as unofficial leader of the Conservative/Protectionist
party in the Commons. 335 Although Stanley still did not particularly like Disraeli, seeing
Disraeli as a bit of an upstart, he recognized him as the only remaining Conservative with any
real merit. Although Stanley mistrusted Disraeli he was keen to avoid the same fate that had
befallen Peel. With Disraeli already acting as unofficial leader in the Commons, Stanley
succumbed to his initiative and finally offered Disraeli the position as the official leader of the
Commons in January of 1849.
The following two years were especially brutal for Stanley’s Protectionists. In the
aftermath of the death of Bentinck, the Conservatives had a greater problem, the future of
protectionism. The repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849 spelled the greatest defeat for
protection as a national policy since the repeal of the Corn Laws. Stanley realized that with the
Navigation Acts repealed and Bentinck dead protection was no longer a feasible base for the
party. 336 Stanley’s wish to abandon protectionism (not endorse free trade) as an official party
doctrine had been a point of tension between Stanley and Bentinck but with Bentinck’s death
Stanley now had the opportunity to begin a return to Conservativism. This ‘return’ was clearly
designed to bring the Protectionists back towards the political center and revive to the successful
ideas that both Stanley and Peel had held during the formative years of the Conservative party.
To maintain the support of Lord Bentinck’s allies, Stanley had to carefully craft the language
with which the Conservatives would abandon protectionism. Both Stanley and the new leader of
the Commons, Disraeli, agreed that a return to the Corn Laws and protectionist policy was
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impossible and politically damaging.337 However, their actions in 1846 had to be justified in
some way. They agreed that the battle over the Corn Laws had to be about party unity and
response to the will of the electorate. Disraeli stated that the election of 1841 was about the
support of protection and in 1846 Peel had acted against that decision as well as the will of his
party in favor of external forces.338 In this way, the protectionist rebellion against Peel was
wholly justified on ethical not ideological grounds.
The abandonment of protectionist policies was not an easy pill for the Protectionists to
swallow, but a necessary one. Stanley’s desire to return his party to the political center required
that protectionism be set aside, not abandoned. Protectionist organizations like the CAPS had
struggled with the weakened position of protectionism after the repeal of the Corn Laws. The
farmers within the society had advocated for the total repeal of the Malt tax ever since the Corn
Laws were repealed in 1846. However, this anti-protectionist action from within a protection
society was very disturbing to Richmond and Stanley. Farmers within the organization in
February of 1849 had voted for the third year in a row that the Conservative party, or what was
left of it, should advocate for the repeal of the Malt tax. This suggestion was met with disgust
from the Protectionists who argued that such a repeal, like the repeal of the Corn Laws, was no
gain to the English farmer.339Additionally, Protectionist members of the society argued that since
the repeal of the Corn Laws the decline in the price of bread had not been as substantial as ACLL
propaganda had suggested it would be.340Therefore they argued that repealing the Malt tax would
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have no long term benefits to the farmers. However, this argument did not settle matters and the
farmers in the society continued to call for repeal. In February of 1850, Stanley knew that the
farmers in the society would vote again to call for the Malt tax to be repealed and that the
Protectionist leaders would again refuse to act. Carefully calculating his moves Stanley knew
that he could never convince his party to advocate repealing a protectionist measure but also
realized, that with the Navigation Acts and Lord Bentinck gone, protectionism was a dying
platform. Therefore Stanley and other Protectionists argued that the defense of protection should
be diverted to other institutions and that opposition should be focused selectively on the things
most tied to free-trade and economic liberalism.
The notion that free-trade and economic liberalism went hand in hand with a debased
democracy and the dismantling of the aristocracy, the empire, and the crown was the primary
reason protectionism remained vital for Conservatives until 1852. Stanley himself had argued in
1846 that repeal was an economic abandonment of the colonial empire.341 The ‘abandonment’ of
protection by Stanley’s Conservatives was not to abandon those ideas associated with it, such as
empire and the aristocracy. Instead, the defense of empire and the preservation of the rights of
the aristocracy would take the place of protection. With the decline of the CAPS the newly
formed National Association of the Protection of British Industry and Capital [NAPIC] wrote a
report that illustrated the changing perception of protectionism. The NAPIC argued that the
agitation led by the ACLL was only the start of a greater ‘war of the classes’ directed at the
aristocracy.342 This war of the classes, Protectionists argued, was part of an attempt to tear down
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the traditional institutions supported by the aristocracy. These same Protectionists argued in
1850, as they had in 1844, for an alliance of the working classes and aristocracy to defend the
traditional ways of life from destruction by the manufacturing class. Additionally, members of
the NAPIC argued that organizations like the ACLL had used the repeal of the Corn Laws as the
starting point to “ulterior projects of a political nature.”343 Democracy and the potential
destruction of the aristocracy were of great concern to members of the NAPIC and the
Conservative party. These ‘ulterior projects’ identified by the NAPIC were arguably aimed at
destroying the political power of the aristocracy and the monarchy. Therefore protectionism was
one of the first things targeted by these radical forces. As the NAPIC suggested, defending other
aspects such as the power of the monarchy and the aristocracy could help to prevent a ‘war of the
classes’. In order for Stanley to rehabilitate the Conservative party and convince its members to
‘abandon’ protection he would have to convince the Protectionists that defending protectionism
was actually ancillary to maintaining the institutions that truly needed to be defended.
To Stanley it was clear that the remaining protectionist arguments were losing ground
quickly. However, convincing the Protectionists to abandon protection was as likely as getting
them to accept free-trade. What Stanley needed to do was to convince the Protectionists to focus
their energy on other things associated with free trade such as democracy, and the dismantling of
the aristocracy and the empire. Therefore, the ‘abandonment’ of the issue of protection in 1852
was more or less a reorganization of the Conservative hierarchy of interests, placing protection
on a lower level of importance. The Conservative position on protection in 1852 was
summarized by Disraeli in blatant terms: “Protection is not only dead but damned.”344 His
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statement concerning the death of protectionism argued that, he, like Peel in 1829 with Catholic
emancipation, had to accept repeal of the Corn Laws as a necessary reform. The final acceptance
of Corn Law repeal by the Conservatives in 1852 was not surrender to free trade ideology but
rather the acceptance of a policy that was now irrevocable.
The Conservative leadership after 1852 solidified around Stanley and Disraeli. The
collapse of Russell’s ministry in February of 1852 over borough reform brought the
Conservatives back into power for the first time since the repeal of the Corn Laws. The
formation of Stanley’s first ministry (February 23 1852-December 19 1852), known as the “who,
who?” ministry, saw to the final reformation of the Conservative party and the ‘abandonment ‘of
protectionism.345 The general election of 1852 saw a reorganization of the Conservative
hierarchy of constitutional issues. Stanley, after assuming the office of Prime Minister, was
more concerned about reforms to Parliament than the continuation of protection.346
Protectionism, which had suffered a colossal defeat in 1849 with the repeal of the Navigation
Acts, was shifted to a lower level of importance. Stanley’s re-organization of the Conservative
hierarchy led his government to address the more important perceived threats to the Church and
other institutions of the state rather than focus on the dying idea of protectionism.347 Stanley
believed that the Conservatives should avoid apposing all reforms or else they may suffer defeat
against the growing coalition between the Peelites and the Whigs. His suggestion to have his
party support reforms, especially Parliamentary, was a return to the Conservative idea that
Stanley had embraced in 1835. Stanley’s argument to his party was that to support the
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institutions of the state, especially the power of the aristocracy, the Conservatives would have to
work for parliamentary reform.348
Stanley’s return to Tamworth Conservativism began with the reorganization of the
hierarchy of Conservative importance. Stanley could not feasibly convince the party to abandon
protectionism in its entirety. However, as John Wilson Croker argued in March of 1852
protection was subordinate to the ‘immediate and imperious’ dangers to the Constitution,
Church, and State. Croker argued that by placing economic protection on a lower level of
importance Conservatives could focus on ‘the most pressing duty of the country, to try and
preserve itself from a revolutionary government.’349 The reorganization of the Conservative
hierarchy allowed for Stanley’s Conservatives to ‘abandon’ protectionism and reinstate
Tamworth Conservativism as its core strategy. This decision by the party to pick and choose its
battles, and selectively oppose measures that were deemed unnecessary, was identical to the
message Peel had advocated in his Tamworth Manifesto nearly twenty years prior. Additionally,
Stanley had come to accept that the repeal of the Corn Laws and the decline of protection were
permanent. Much like Peel had done in the case of Catholic emancipation and the Great Reform
Bill, Stanley too had to see repeal as a necessary reform to preserve the overall nature of the
government and so too did the Protectionists. By accepting that repeal was irrevocable and
necessary Stanley had followed his, and Peel’s, principles that had existed as Conservative party
canon since 1834.
The vote of no confidence against the Russell government in 1852 allowed Stanley and
the Conservatives a chance to return to government. While Stanley (officially called The 14th
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Earl of Derby) had accepted that protection needed to be abandoned many of his Conservatives
still did not. Stanley was pressured by Lord Beaumont to say whether or not he planned for his
Ministry to bring back the Corn Laws. Artfully dodging the question, Stanley assured his party
that such a matter would not be addressed unless it needed to be.350 Upon forming his Ministry,
Stanley wanted to avoid another mishap with Disraeli as Peel had in 1841. Appointing Disraeli
as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his 1852 Ministry, Stanley began to work with Disraeli to
reinstate Tamworth Conservativism. Disraeli may have looked like a bit of a misfit surrounded
by aristocrats and landed gentry, but he was twice as bright as any of them and people like
Stanley had to recognize Disraeli for his talent. In comparison, the remainder of the Conservative
party lacked quality orators or basic competence but, what it lacked Disraeli could make up for
tenfold, as so Disraeli thought!
The continuation of the Conservative party, albeit divided, owes its post-repeal existence
to Peel’s original design of the party. Stanley and, to some degree, Disraeli were keen to return to
an era that had certain Conservative ideological characteristics before the split over the Corn
Laws. Stanley’s objective after 1852 was to steer the Conservative party out of the trouble it had
placed itself in.351 For him it was more than a debate between protection and free trade, it was
about creating a party that could carefully move the old establishment into the nineteenth
century.352 Critics and historians alike have observed that the Conservative party under Stanley
(Derby) from 1846-1868 was badly disoriented. However, the twenty-two years of Stanley’s
leadership illustrated a return to Conservativism. Under Stanley the Conservatives were led by a
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man, schooled in the successes and failures of Conservative, was well as Whig, government. The
irony of Stanley’s leadership was that the man who brought back Peel’s Tamworth
Conservativism, and the electoral success that accompanied it, was exactly the kind of man who
Disraeli’s characters Tadpole and Taper had mocked in Coningsby in 1844. 353 Stanley’s tenure
as party leader saw a revival of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism and ensured that under his
leadership the Conservatives would return to be the moderate custodians of the institutions of
Church and State. It was only fitting that Stanley would lead this post-repeal return to
Conservativism as his original Knowsley Creed had so closely mirrored Peel’s own Tamworth
Conservativism.354 The principles that Stanley, and Peel, had stood for again became the
foundation of the Conservative party. Stanley’s leadership and return to Conservativism in 1852
would bear witness to his determination to make the Conservatives part of the political center,
something he had advocated for in his Knowsley Creed nearly twenty years earlier.
While Stanley remained the effective leader of the Conservative party until his death in
1869, Disraeli would also take the mantle of Peel and begin to build a new Conservative party
beyond both Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism and Stanley’s Knowsley Creed. Disraeli’s
Conservativism would honor the ideas of careful reform set in motion by Peel and expand them
to give Conservativism strong principles. First described in Coningsby and Sybil Disraeli began
to establish a definition for a post-Tamworth Conservative ideology. It was through these ideas
that Disraeli had professed in his earlier writings, commenting on Robert Peel’s lack of
principles, prescriptions, or preparations for the future that helped to shape the establishment of a
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Conservative political ideology after the death of Peel.355 Peel’s position on the Maynooth Grant,
the Repeal of the Corn Laws and Catholic emancipation two decades earlier were evidence
enough that Peel had betrayed Tory principles. However, his ‘betrayal’ was not a form of Whig
appeasement but an attempt to change the Tories into a new Conservative party.
As Disraeli wrote in Sybil, Peel’s party was “an old crazy factor, vamped up, and whitewashed into decency” that is to say, Peel had attempted to fix the problems the Tories faced in
1832, but Disraeli argued that they were not repaired by his Manifesto in 1834. 356 Peel’s
Conservative party was simply a disguised version of the old dysfunctional Tory party. As some
historians have suggested it would be Disraeli’s politics that would unify the ideas of Empire, the
Church and the franchise together into his notion of one-nation Conservativism. 357 However,
Disraeli’s Conservativism could not have succeeded without the foundation that Peel had created
in 1834 and Stanley had revived in 1852. Disraeli’s Conservativism was to function as an
ideology for both the rich and the poor. Much like Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism Disraeli’s
one-nation Conservativism was meant to fully change the Tories into Conservatives. The legacy
of Peel’s Conservativism that survived the Corn Law crisis laid the crucial foundation upon
which the mid-Victorian generation built its politics. It was through this second application of
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism by Stanley starting in 1852, and strengthened later by Disraeli,
that the Conservative party was brought back from its schism in 1846. It remains an important
facet that is often overlooked, that Peel’s role in setting up the Conservative party may have
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personally ended in 1846, but his ideas laid the foundation on which Stanley and Disraeli were
able to expand upon Peel’s original Conservative message.
***
The legacy of Tamworth Conservativism as this thesis demonstrated continued beyond
Peel and did not end with Conservative division in 1846 or the death of Peel in 1850. The
developmental process of Tamworth Conservativism that began in the ’liberal’ Tory era was
both a product of the times and of Robert Peel. The central tenets of Peel’s Tamworth
Conservativism were to accept previous reforms, preserve important institutions, pursue further
needed reforms, both civil and ecclesiastical, and to refuse to accept unnecessary reforms that
were perceived to be so radical that they threatened to undermine the very nature of British
society. These fundamental principles of Peel’s Tamworth Conservavtism became incredibly
influential and despite their detractors were the new type of politics for the nineteenth century.
Peel’s legacy, as Norman Gash has stated, was one of great importance for the formation
of modern British politics and the transformation of Britain into a democracy. The legacy of
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism however, was not so much a pragmatic centrist outlook as
Gash had suggested.358 Peel’s politics have been reevaluated and in light of this work it can be
concluded that Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism demonstrated an adherence to a consistent form
of politics dating back to the Liverpool era. An assessment of Peel’s early political career
illustrates that his acceptance of Catholic emancipation only occurred after nearly a decade of his
opposition to such a reform.359 According to Gash, his change of heart was part of his pragmatic
centrist ideology. However, his anti-reformist stance on Catholic emancipation and the later
Reform Bill makes this claim problematic. His rationalization behind this change of heart over
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Catholic emancipation and the expansion of the franchise was to maintain the stability of the
state. In his memoirs, Peel argued that Catholic emancipation and the Repeal of the Corn Laws
were the most difficult but necessary reforms that he ever had to support.360 Therefore it may be
difficult to position Peel as a great reformer through an investigation of only his early career.
However, Gash may be correct in his argument that Peel, after 1832, sought to pursue reform as
a pragmatic way to conserve the state. Peel’s pragmatism, however, was not the sole ideology
behind his Tamworth Conservativism. As Hilton argued, Peel’s politics were more than a
reaction to the necessary changes that the nation required.
Boyd Hilton’s 1979 reevaluation of Peel’s politics argues that the centrist approach to
Peel by Gash had ignored the era in which Peel’s politics took root. A thorough examination of
Peel’s entire political career illustrates that Peel was not a pragmatic centrist whose politics
changed to support reforms, but rather that he had always been a follower of a certain type of
‘liberalism’ dating back to the Liverpool government. Peel, in Hilton’s revision, remained a
rigid doctrinaire who was committed to free trade as far back as the 1820s.361 Hilton argued that
while Peel rightfully remains the father of the Conservative party he was also the progenitor of
Gladstonian Liberalism. This argument can be verified in the continuation of many of Peel’s
ideas by the Peelites, especially Gladstone and Aberdeen, after Peel’s death in 1850.362
However, this evaluation of Peelite Conservativism only focuses on the direct heirs of Peel’s
politics. As Angus Hawking in his work on Lord Stanley suggests, a re-adoption of Peelite
Conservativism by the Protectionists, starting with the name change in 1852, indicates that Peel’s
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Conservativism was applied to the Conservative party a second time. However, Hawking does
not pursue this argument fully, suggesting that the Protectionists revisited the politics of Peel
after the slow death of protectionism.363 Therefore, unlike the arguments made by previous
historians, as this work has argued, Peel held a certain set of values that guided him throughout
his entire career.
As this thesis has argued, these values, different from mainstream Tory values, had their
roots in the ‘liberal’ Tory era of Lord Liverpool as Hilton argued. However, unlike Hilton, this
work has shown that Peel’s politics were not a simple continuation of ‘liberal’ Toryism, but
rather a hybridization of Pittie Tory values and Whiggish liberalism. This hybridization was the
fundamental element of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism. Expressed explicitly in his Tamworth
Manifesto the ideas such as necessity of reform for any and all state institutions, the
representation of the people (both enfranchised and those who were not), and the pursuit of
reforms were all guiding themes that were consistent throughout Peel’s political career. These
themes have been mistaken by Gash as centrist pragmatism and by Hilton as the continuation of
‘liberal’ Torysism. While Peel’s contemporary critics argued that he had betrayed Conservative
values multiple times Peel himself argued that he had advocated dramatic measures out of their
necessity to maintain the security of the state.364 Peel’s statement in his memoirs arguably
supports this claim that he was consistent with his political beliefs and that charges of apostasy
were without warrant.
He designed his new party to appeal to an audience beyond the old electorate and to
create a constructive ministry. Peel’s Conservatives would, through these means, turn the defeat
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of 1832 into a series of successive victories leading up to a Conservative (Tory) triumph in 1841.
Peel’s electoral victory in 1841was followed by a successful ministry built on necessary reforms
to the institutions of the state. Amendments to the Corn Laws, the passage of the Factory Act and
reforms to the Church were supported by a majority of his party and were successful examples of
his Tamworth Conservativism in action. However, his decision to repeal the Corn Laws in late
1845 broke his party in half. Peel’s personal beliefs over protectionism and the Corn Laws have
been a long debated and heavily politicized topic. Gash and other historians have argued that
Peel came to be enlightened by free trade principles in 1845, while others have claimed Peel had
converted to free trade as early as 1820 (Hilton). Regardless of his own position on free trade, in
1820, 1841, 1846, or 1850, the important ideas behind his Conservativism during the Corn Law
crisis manifested themselves as a reform to preserve the peace and security of the nation, a
political principle that had remained consistent his entire life. His consistencies, rather than
individual pragmatic decisions, are what shaped the modern political discourse in Britain.
As this thesis demonstrates, a reevaluation of Peel’s politics cannot undervalue his
political achievements and the changes his Tamworth Conservativism initiated. Peel’s 1834 Tory
revival had returned the party from its disaster of 1832. 365 Peel’s early political career in the
Liverpool government and his acceptance of Catholic emancipation in 1829 set his own form of
Conservativism in place: one that was built around the need to pursue necessary reforms for the
security of the state. Peel’s influence across the political system helped to convince the political
elites (both Whigs and Conservatives) to become responsive to the growing demands of the
working classes, through changes to factory labor legislation and eventually repeal of the Corn
Laws. His idea of Conservativism was often critiqued for its lack of principles or a definitive
ideology. Members of Peel’s party often questioned where the line was to be drawn when it
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came to the reform of state institutions. The Corn Law crisis of 1846 was the watershed moment
in Peel’s political career that challenged his Conservativism. The decision to repeal the Corn
Laws cost Peel his political career and the unity of his new Conservative party. However, the
Conservative split fueled by Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws was not the end of Peel’s
Tamworth Conservativism. The Protectionist faction lead by Stanley, Disraeli and Bentinck
begin to revive the Conservative party after the Corn Law crisis and looked back to Peel’s
Tamworth Conservativism for guidance. The changes that Peel helped to initiate set about a new
political discourse in Britain that would be built upon the necessity of reform.
Peel’s politics whether ‘Liberal’ or ‘Conservative’ left a substantial mark on the political
discourse of modern Britain. The making of the Conservative party through Peel’s Tamworth
Conservativism as this thesis has shown was an active process of transforming the old Tory party
into a new Conservative one. As Disraeli later suggested the greatest strength of Peel’s
Conservative party was its ability to rally under any disadvantage.366 Peel had attempted to
redesign the Tories for a modern age far too rapidly and without taking into account the diversity
of opinions within his Conservative coalition. That task of reforming the Conservative ideology
would fall on Lord Stanley who, after the Corn Law crisis would look back to Peel’s earlier form
of Conservativism and apply it a second time, bringing about the complete transformation of the
Tories into Conservative Party that Peel had initiated in 1834.
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